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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF "UNUSUAL": THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AS A BAR TO CRUEL
INNOVATION
John F. Stinneford"
"Were your health in danger, would you take new medicine? I need not
make use of these exclamations: for every member in this committee must
be alarmed at making new and unusual experiments in government. "
"It is the genius of the common law to resist innovation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both legal scholars and the American public have be-
come aware that something is not quite right with the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Legal commentators from across the
spectrum have described the Court's treatment of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause as "embarrassing,' "ineffectual and incoherent,"' a
"mess, ' '3 and a "train wreck."'4
The feeling that modem Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has gone off
the rails has arisen, at least in part, from the wildly inconsistent rulings that
have emanated from the Supreme Court over the past few decades, particu-
larly regarding proportionality in sentencing and the death penalty. For ex-
ample, in Rummel v. Estelle,' the Court upheld a life sentence for a small-
time recidivist who was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.
The Court brushed off the argument that the sentence was grossly dispro-
portionate to the offense, stating that "one could argue without fear of con-
tradiction by any decision of this Court" that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause does not require any proportionality between crime and
sentence outside the death penalty context.6 Three years later, in Solem v.
Helm,7 the Court struck down a life sentence for another small-time recidi-
vist who had been convicted of uttering a "no account" check for $100.00
because the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the offense-the very
ground the Court dismissed in Rummel. Finally, in Ewing v. California,'
the Court affirmed the reasoning of Solem but reached a Rummel-like result,
holding that proportionality plays a role in determining whether a sentence
I Robert Weisberg, Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A2 1.
2 Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677,
684 (2005).
3 Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 475
(2005).
4 Benjamin Wittes, What Is "Cruel and Unusual"?, POL'Y REV., Dec. 2005-Jan. 2006, at 15, 16.
5 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
6 Id. at 274. The Rummel court does allow for the possibility that the proportionality principle may
come into play in the "extreme example" of a legislature making a parking violation a felony punishable
by life imprisonment. Id. at 274 n. 11.
7 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
8 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003).
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of imprisonment is cruel and unusual, but refusing to overturn a sentence of
twenty-five years to life for a small-time recidivist who had been convicted
of shoplifting three golf clubs.
The Court's decisions with respect to the death penalty have been no
more consistent than its non-death penalty proportionality jurisprudence. In
Stanford v. Kentucky,9 for example, the Court ruled that execution of six-
teen- or seventeen-year-old murderers was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment per se. Sixteen years later, in Roper v. Simmons,"° the Court ruled that
it was. Similarly, in Penry v. Lynaugh," the Court held that execution of
the mentally retarded was not necessarily cruel and unusual. Thirteen years
later, in Atkins v. Virginia,2 the Court held that it was. As these results in-
dicate, in recent decades, the Supreme Court's prior decisions as to the
scope and application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause have
been poor indicators of what the Court will do in the future.
Even more remarkably, in none of the cases mentioned above did the
Court hold that the earlier cases were wrongly decided. In the non-death
penalty proportionality cases, the Court stretched to distinguish the facts
and recharacterize the holdings of the prior cases to make them appear con-
sistent with the later rulings, despite the opposing results. 3 In the death
penalty cases, the Court did something different and far stranger. In Atkins
v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court appeared to agree
that the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded and on
seventeen-year-olds respectively was not cruel and unusual punishment in
1989, when Penry v. Lynaugh and Stanford v. Kentucky were decided.
Nonetheless, the Court held that such punishments are cruel and unusual
today. 4 As Justice Scalia stated in his Roper dissent, the decisions in Atkins
and Roper are based on the proposition "that the meaning of our Constitu-
tion has changed over the past 15 years-not, mind you, that this Court's
decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed.' 15
And, indeed, Justice Scalia was correct. The Atkins and Roper decisions
were based on the notion that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."16 As societal standards change, so do
the punishments permitted by the Eighth Amendment. This approach to
9 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
10 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
11 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
12 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
13 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-29; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 n.13 (1983).
14 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
15 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61. As discussed below, the Atkins
and Roper Courts relied upon Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), the case in which the "evolving
standards of decency" formulation was first employed. See infra Part II.A.
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is known as the "evolving standards" ap-
proach.
In response to the instability of the Supreme Court's evolving stan-
dards jurisprudence, Justice Scalia has formulated an originalist approach to
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.17 Justice Scalia's approach
holds that the Clause was intended to prohibit only certain inherently cruel
forms of punishment, such as the rack, that were already unacceptable by
the end of the eighteenth century."8 This approach contends that because
grossly disproportionate punishments were imposed at the end of the eight-
eenth century (at least in England), the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause must not have been intended to outlaw disproportionate sentencing. 9
Similarly, because the death penalty was widely available at the end of the
eighteenth century, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause must not
have been intended to restrict capital punishment significantly."
Although Justice Scalia's approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause promises much greater consistency than the evolving stan-
dards approach, it is a consistency that Justice Scalia himself seems
unprepared to embrace wholly. Eighteenth-century notions of acceptable
punishment were sometimes much more "robust" than those that prevail to-
day. In eighteenth-century England, for example, it was legally permissible
to publicly disembowel or bum traitors alive.2  In America, criminal of-
fenders were subjected to public flogging, pillorying, or even mutilation.22
The First Congress authorized the death penalty for crimes we now consider
relatively minor, such as counterfeiting.23 Given the great contrast between
these historical practices and modem sensibilities, Justice Scalia has an-
nounced that he would likely use the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause to strike down any attempt to revive punishments such as flogging,
despite the fact that he would have to violate his own originalist principles
to do so.24
17 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-85 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (setting forth Justice Scalia's
discussion of the historical evidence regarding the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
18 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Eighth Amendment is addressed to al-
ways-and-everywhere 'cruel' punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew."); Antonin Scalia, Re-
sponse, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 145 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause does not mean 'whatever may be considered cruel from one genera-
tion to the next,' but 'what we consider cruel today'; otherwise, it would be no protection against the
moral perceptions of a future, more brutal, generation" (quoting Ronald Dworkin)).
19 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 973-975.
20 Scalia, supra note 18, at 145 ("[I]t is entirely clear that capital punishment, which was widely in
use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral principle of the Eighth Amendment.").
21 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *376-77.
22 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1993).
23 See Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 14, 1 Stat. 112
(1790).
24 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
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The dueling approaches to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
described above are sometimes taken to be paradigmatic of the larger inter-
pretive battle between the Court's originalists and nonoriginalists, for it is
in the context of the Eighth Amendment that the contrast between the two
approaches seems most extreme. 25 The position staked out by the originalist
dissenters is so far removed from modem sensibilities that the originalists
themselves (or at least Justice Scalia) are unwilling to follow it in every
case. The Court's nonoriginalists, on the other hand, have steadfastly re-
fused even to consult the original intent of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, holding that the Clause must be interpreted according to
current standards, not those of the eighteenth century.
The majority's nonoriginalist approach and Justice Scalia's originalist
approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause are not nearly so
different as they seem, however. 6 The two approaches share three key
commonalities and have but one difference. First, both approaches essen-
tially read the word "unusual" out of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, either characterizing it as meaningless boilerplate, or assigning it a
weak meaning and then ignoring it. Second, both approaches treat the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as if it stated a vague moral com-
mand ("Don't Be Cruel") that provides no concrete guidance as to its own
interpretation and application. Third, both approaches assume-without
making any effort to justify this assumption-that applying the "Don't Be
Cruel" principle is more or less a matter of discerning public opinion at a
given point in time. The only difference between the two approaches is in
the point in time chosen: The majority's nonoriginalist approach looks to
current public opinion in measuring the constitutionality of a given punish-
ment, whereas Justice Scalia's originalist approach looks to public opinion
in 1790. As will be shown in Part II, both approaches are unworkable.
This Article will argue that the key to restoring both the effectiveness
and stability of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is a renewed
recognition of the original meaning of the word "unusual." In making this
argument, I do not intend to make any larger claim as to whether the "origi-
nal meaning" of the constitutional text must always be dispositive in consti-
tutional interpretation. Rather, I proceed from a more modest set of
assumptions upon which most people will, I believe, agree: (1) that the
original meaning of the text is relevant to constitutional interpretation,
whatever one's position in the larger originalism/nonoriginalism debate; (2)
that it is therefore worthwhile to seek to determine the original meaning of
constitutional text where that meaning has previously been ignored or un-
derdeveloped; and (3) that if one can determine the original meaning of the
25 See, e.g., William C. Heffeman, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1362-63 (2005) (identifying
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as indicative of a judicial debate between historicists and originalists).
26 See infra Part I1.
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constitutional text, one should examine the effect one's conclusions may
have on existing constitutional doctrine, particularly where the affected doc-
trinal area suffers from incoherence or instability-as does the Supreme
Court's current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.27
As noted above, the original meaning of the word "unusual" has
largely been ignored by both the originalist and the nonoriginalist members
of the Supreme Court. While some have occasionally ventured an opinion
about the word's meaning--or lack thereof--all have ignored the word in
practice.29 Scholars have also generally ignored the word in their treatment
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Those scholars who have
taken a position on the word's meaning have generally followed the Court
in arguing that the word is either meaningless3' or that it means "different
from that which is generally done"-either in 1790 or today.32 One scholar
27 Of course, a thoroughgoing originalist would hold that the original meaning of the constitutional
text should govern, regardless of whether its application will yield desirable results. As noted above, I
make no claims in this article regarding the "big picture" debate over originalism and constitutional in-
terpretation.
28 Chief Justice Warren, for example, has argued that the word "unusual" either has no independent
meaning or else means "different from that which is generally done." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
n.32 (1958). This reading of the word has dominated the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for
the past fifty years. See infra Part II.A. Justice Scalia has argued that in the English Bill of Rights, the
word "unusual" probably meant "contrary to precedent," but that in its American context, the word
meant "different from that which is generally done." See infra Part II.B.3. A few other Justices have
ventured opinions as to the meaning of the word "unusual." For example, in Furman v. Georgia, Justice
Stewart implied that the term applied to punishments that were "wantonly and ... freakishly imposed"
and that were thus comparable to being "struck by lightning." 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). In the same case, Justice Douglas opined that "unusual" means "discriminatory":
It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is "unusual"
if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if
it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.
Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
29 See infra Part 11.
30 Even scholars who have focused on the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause have tended to ignore the meaning of the word "unusual." See, e.g., Celia Rumann, Tortured
History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661
(2004) (focusing on the word "punishment").
31 See, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969) (arguing that the phrase "cruel and unusual" was a kind of
"constitutional 'boilerplate').
32 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 41 (1982) (agreeing with Chief Justice Warren's
statement in Trop that "unusual" should be taken to mean "something different from that which [was]
generally done," but arguing that Chief Justice Warren had made a "mistake" in failing to recognize that
the relevant time frame for determining unusualness was the year in which the Eighth Amendment was
adopted, not the year in which Trap was decided); Michael J. Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitu-
tional? And Even if We Think It Is, Should We Want the Supreme Court to So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REV.
867, 880 (2007) (arguing that the most likely meaning of the word "unusual" was that given in the most
popular dictionary of the late eighteenth century, Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage, first published in 1756, which defined "unusual" as "Not common; not frequent; rare").
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has recently argued that the word should be taken to mean "immorally dis-
criminatory."'33
In fact, the historical evidence shows that none of these arguments is
entirely correct. As used in the Eighth Amendment, the word "unusual"
was a term of art that referred to government practices that are contrary to
"long usage" or "immemorial usage."34 Under the common law ideology
that came to the founding generation through Coke, Blackstone, and various
others, the best way to discern whether a government practice comported
with principles of justice was to determine whether it was continuously em-
ployed throughout the jurisdiction for a very long time, and thus enjoyed
"long usage."35 The opposite of a practice that enjoyed "long usage" was an
"unusual" practice, or in other words, an innovation. For example, when
the British Parliament sought, in 1769, to remove American protesters to
England for trial-thus vitiating the traditional right of trial in the vicinage
of the offense-the Virginia House of Burgesses complained that this
threatened action was "new, unusual, ...unconstitutional and illegal."36
Similarly, in 1788, Patrick Henry complained that the lack of common law
constraints contained in the new United States Constitution would make the
federal government itself nothing more than a series of "new and unusual
experiments."37
The use of the word "unusual" in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause indicates that at least two assumptions underlie the Clause: First,
when the government introduces new or foreign punishment practices, such
practices are often crueler than those that preceded them. Second, the best
way to prevent cruel governmental innovation is to compare new punish-
ment practices to traditional practices that enjoy long usage. If the new
practice is significantly harsher than the traditional practice, then it is not
merely unusual, but "cruel and unusual."
The historical evidence indicates that "unusual" punishments fell into
three main categories: (1) punishment practices that were either entirely
new or were foreign to the common law system, including-perhaps pri-
marily-those that were used in civil law jurisdictions;38 (2) punishments
33 Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 119,
122 (2004).
34 See infra Part Ill.
35 See infra Part III.B-C.
36 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES, 1766-1769, at 215 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed.,
1906).
37 Henry, supra note t, at 172.
38 Anger at the English sovereign's attempts to "innovate" by replacing common law practices with
civil law practices, and the fear that the new federal government would do the same thing, is a theme
that runs strongly throughout the history, and appears several times in the debates over the need for a
Bill of Rights. See infra Part III.B.I, C.2, D.2, E.1-2. Indeed, Abraham Holmes's complaint at the
Massachusetts convention for ratifying the United States Constitution-that the new government would
be permitted to impose "cruel and unheard-of punishments" including "racks and gibbets"-was part of
a larger Antifederalist argument that the lack of common law constraints would permit the federal gov-
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that were newly married to crimes with which they had not traditionally
been associated-for example, Parliament's decision to make it a capital of-
fense "to cut down a cherry tree in an orchard," among numerous other mi-
nor offenses;39 and (3) traditional punishments that had fallen completely
out of usage and were then revived, such as the practice of "ducking" in
cold water a woman convicted of being a "common scold."4 In each case,
the punishment was presumptively unjust because it attempted to replace
"reasonable" punishment practices that had developed over a very long pe-
riod of time with something that was either new, foreign, or previously tried
and then rejected.4'
Recognition of the original meaning of "unusual" will precisely invert
the evolving standards of decency test. The evolving standards of decency
test asks courts to judge traditional punishment practices in light of current
standards of decency. By contrast, the word "unusual" directs courts to
judge new punishment practices in light of our longstanding traditions.
Thus, the benefit of recognizing the original meaning of "unusual" is that it
will make the courts more effective in blocking governmental attempts to
increase the harshness of punishment significantly beyond what has tradi-
tionally been permitted, rather than limiting their focus to those traditional
punishments that are already on the way out. This approach also offers
greater flexibility than Justice Scalia's approach to original meaning be-
cause it recognizes that when a traditional punishment-such as flogging-
falls out of usage, it loses the presumption of validity that comes with being
"usual." Any attempt to reintroduce the punishment would be an innova-
tion, and the scrutiny the punishment would receive would be at least as
great as-and perhaps greater than-the scrutiny given to entirely new pun-
ishments.42
ernment to adopt the cruel practices of the civil law. Abraham Holmes, Speech to the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention for the United States Constitution (Jan. 30, 1788), in 2 ELLIOTr's DEBATES, supra
note t, at I11.
39 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *4. Indeed, as discussed below, the "cruell and unusuall pun-
ishments" clause in the English Bill of Rights was directed primarily at the use of traditional punishment
methods in new or unprecedented ways. See infra Part II.B.2.
40 See James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220 (Pa. 1825), discussed infra Part III.F.2.
41 Cf THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 329-30 (Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co. 1868) ("It is somewhat difficult to determine precisely what is meant by cruel and un-
usual punishments. Probably a punishment declared by statute for an offence which was punishable in
the same way at the common law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense.
And probably any new statutory offence may be made punishable to the extent permitted by the com-
mon law for similar offences. But those degrading punishments which in any state had become obsolete
before its existing constitution was adopted, we think may well be held to be forbidden by it as cruel and
unusual. We may well doubt the right to establish the whipping-post and the pillory in States where
they were never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in States whose constitutions, revised since
public opinion had banished them, had forbidden cruel and unusual punishments.").
42 Some scholars have considered the possibility that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
was originally intended to reflect changing societal standards to some degree. See, e.g., Ronald
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The implications of recognizing the original meaning of "unusual" are
not merely academic. In recent decades, both Congress and numerous state
legislatures have significantly increased the penalties imposed on criminal
offenders for a wide range of crimes.43 Seven states have imposed the pre-
viously unthinkable punishment of chemical castration on sex offenders,
and several more are currently debating the imposition of surgical castra-
tion, a punishment practice that fell out of usage in England in the thirteenth
century.' Such new punishments are often popular, and thus arguably com-
port with current standards of decency.45 Without a renewed recognition of
the significance of the word "unusual," courts will be powerless when faced
with the primary danger against which much of the Bill of Rights, including
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, was designed to protect: the
tyranny of enflamed majority opinion.
Part II of this Article describes the Supreme Court's current Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence in greater detail, and demon-
strates that the decision to ignore the word "unusual" has led the Court's
nonoriginalist majority and originalist dissent to adopt untenable positions
with respect to the meaning and application of the Clause. Part III demon-
strates the original meaning of the word "unusual" and shows how the con-
cept of long usage was integral to the development of Anglo American
conceptions of rights in general, and of the right against cruel and unusual
punishments in particular. Part IV discusses in greater detail the implica-
tions of recognizing the original meaning of "unusual" in the Court's mod-
em Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Part V provides a brief conclusion.
II. CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE: MORAL PRINCIPLE, PUBLIC
OPINION, AND THE ERASURE OF "UNUSUAL"
The phrase "cruel and unusual" is a common and familiar one.46 We
hear it all the time. When a prisoner is tortured, we denounce the practice
Dworkin, Comment, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 115, 120; Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 544-47 (2003).
43 For example, in 1986, 21 U.S.C. § 841 was amended to include, among other things, a ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence for the possession of fifty grams of a "mixture or substance" containing
crack cocaine. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-2
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(iii) (2006)). See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN,
HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE
(2003) (describing the increasingly severe approach to punishment that characterizes the American
criminal justice system).
44 See generally John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559 (2006) (cataloging,
detailing, and criticizing these state proposals).
45 At least one court has suggested that the popularity of laws imposing chemical castration on sex
offenders may indicate an "emerging" societal consensus in favor of the practice that would preclude a
finding that chemical castration violates evolving standards of decency. See People v. Steele, No.
C044408, 2004 WL 2897955, at *2 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2004).
46 A Google search for the phrase "cruel and unusual" turns up approximately one million results.
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as "cruel and unusual."47 When an offender is sentenced to death or a long
prison term, the sentence is often appealed on the ground that it is "cruel
and unusual."" When prison medical care is inadequate,49 when force is
used to subdue a prisoner," or even when a prisoner is subjected to second-
hand smoke,5' the prisoner may file suit claiming that he has been subjected
to "cruel and unusual" punishment. The phrase is common even in every
day life: When a child is told she has to eat her broccoli, when a football
player has to do extra drills during preseason conditioning, or when a wed-
ding guest is assigned a seat next to a boring, drunk, or obnoxious person,
each is likely to describe his or her ordeal as "cruel and unusual."
But even though the phrase "cruel and unusual" is quite common, its
actual meaning is not entirely clear. The meaning of the word "unusual"
seems particularly difficult. Does it mean rare? Out of the ordinary? Un-
common? Discriminatory? Illegal? Or perhaps the word has no meaning
at all and is mere surplus verbiage.
Some things are known about the phrase "cruel and unusual punish-
ments." It first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, in response
to the sentencing practices of royal judges in the reign of King James 11.52 It
appeared once again in 1776, across the Atlantic, in the Declaration of
Rights George Mason drafted for the Commonwealth of Virginia. 3 It ap-
peared a third time, in 1788, among the amendments recommended by the
Virginia convention when it ratified the United States Constitution. 4 Fi-
nally, James Madison placed a proscription against "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" in the Bill of Rights he drafted for the U.S. Constitution, and this
language ultimately became part of the Eighth Amendment.5
Despite this long pedigree, however, neither the Court's nonoriginalist
majority nor its originalist dissenters have been able to determine what the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-and particularly the word "un-
47 See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("[lt is safe to affirm that punishments of
torture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth] Amend-
ment to the Constitution.").
48 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty for juveniles); Ewing v. Cali-
foria, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (life sentence under three-strikes statute for offender convicted of shoplifting
golf clubs).
49 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
50 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
51 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
52 See An Act Declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the
Crowne (1688), in 6 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 143 (1819) [hereinafter An Act Declareing]; see also
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *379 (noting that the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause in the
English Bill of Rights "had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings in the court of king's bench,
in the reign of king James the second").
53 See infra Part 111.D.4.
54 See infra Part III.E.2-3.
55 See infra Part lI.E.3; see also ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 9
(1991).
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usual"--meant to the generation of Americans that adopted the Eighth
Amendment. Rather, as shown below, both groups have chosen to ignore
the word "unusual" and have thus treated the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause as though it embodies a vague and abstract moral principle:
"Don't Be Cruel." Moreover, both groups have assumed that applying this
moral principle is more or less a matter of discerning public opinion at a
given point in time. Nonoriginalists look to indicators of current public
opinion, whereas originalists look to public opinion in 1790. This approach
to the Clause has led the nonoriginalists to adopt a standard that is highly
unstable and manipulable, and has led the originalists to adopt a standard
that would make the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause virtually a
dead letter if applied consistently. Section A will describe and critique the
evolving standards approach currently followed by a majority of the court,
and section B will describe and critique Justice Scalia's originalist ap-
proach.
A. Standardless Standards: Evolving Standards of Decency
and the Erasure of "Unusual"
1. The Birth of the "Evolving Standards of Decency" Test.-The
evolving standards of decency test, which has dominated the Supreme
Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence over the past
fifty years, was first articulated by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles. 6
In that case, the Court was called upon to decide whether denationalization
was a "cruel and unusual punishment" for the crime of desertion. 7 But be-
fore making this decision, the Court had to decide what the Clause itself
meant. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Chief Justice Warren surveyed
Supreme Court caselaw dating back to 1878 and made the following con-
clusion regarding the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause:
On the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase,
precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been
drawn. These cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treat-
ment, without regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the
word "unusual." If the word "unusual" is to have any meaning apart from the
word "cruel," however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying
something different from that which is generally done. 8
This two part formula-(a) the meaning of "unusual" probably does not
matter, but (b) if the meaning does matter, "unusual" means "different from
that which is generally done"-is notable for at least two reasons. First, in
56 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
57 Id. at 87.
58 Id. at 100 n.32 (citations omitted).
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arriving at this formula, Chief Justice Warren made no effort to discern the
original meaning of the Clause. The earliest authority he cited was a case
decided in 1878, nearly ninety years after the Eighth Amendment was
adopted. 9 Second, the formula appears to be designedly ambiguous as to
whether the word "unusual" should play any independent role in the inter-
pretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The key to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is its "basic prohibition against in-
human treatment." The question of whether such treatment is "unusual" is
either secondary or wholly irrelevant.
The Trop plurality's reading of the word "unusual"-or, more accu-
rately, its refusal to give a definite reading of this word-laid the essential
groundwork for the Court's modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Without the word "unusual," the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
becomes simply the "Cruel Punishments" Clause. It embodies a vague and
abstract moral command: "Don't Be Cruel." If a punishment is cruel, we
should not impose it. There is no point, this approach implies, in wasting
time Worrying about whether such a punishment is also "unusual," whatever
that word means.
After effectively removing the word "unusual" from the interpretive
picture, the Court needed to set forth a standard for determining whether a
punishment is impermissibly cruel. Defining such a standard was a prob-
lem with which the Supreme Court struggled for much of the twentieth cen-
tury: Are we bound by the notions of cruelty that prevailed at the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted? Are we forbidden from taking into ac-
count the fact that eighteenth-century notions of acceptable punishment
were sometimes much harsher than those that prevail today? In eighteenth-
century England, it was legally acceptable to publicly disembowel or burn
traitors alive." In America, criminal offenders were subjected to public
whipping, pillorying, or even mutilation.6 The First Congress authorized
execution of those convicted of counterfeiting, among other things.62 If
such punishments were acceptable at the time the Eighth Amendment was
adopted, does this mean that the Eighth Amendment poses no bar to their
use today?
To all of these questions, the Trop Court answered no. Rather, the
Court looked to a case decided in 1910, Weems v. United States,63 in which
the Court had suggested that the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause may be "progressive," and "may acquire meaning as public
59 Id. The earliest case cited by the Court in this context was Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878).
60 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *376-77.
61 FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 40.
62 See Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 14, 1 Stat. 112
(1790).
63 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."' Chief Justice Warren
adopted this suggestion as the basis for his new standard for determining
whether a given punishment was impermissibly cruel. Rather than tying the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the outdated standards of the
past, the Trop Court held that the Clause "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety. 65
2. The "Who Decides?" Problem.-The evolving standards of de-
cency test seemed, at first, to offer the possibility that the Eighth Amend-
ment could be used by the courts to eliminate all the "barbaric" vestiges of
an earlier and more vengeful time. As society "progresses," and becomes
kinder and more enlightened, so too does the Eighth Amendment. Indeed,
in Furman v. Georgia, Justices Brennan and Marshall confidently asserted
that the death penalty itself no longer comported with evolving standards of
decency,66 only to have their hopes dashed when thirty-five states reenacted
death penalty laws immediately after Furman struck them down.67
But from the beginning, there were deep practical and theoretical prob-
lems with the evolving standards of decency test. The first and most obvi-
ous of these was the "Who decides?" problem. In adopting the evolving
standards of decency test, was the Supreme Court setting itself up as the ul-
timate arbiter of the nation's evolving moral standards? Or is the Court re-
quired to look to external sources for these standards? If so, what sources?
And what criteria should the Court use in examining them?
The Supreme Court has never answered any of these questions head-
on. At times it has emphasized the need to rely upon "objective indicia" of
current standards of decency, such as legislative enactments and jury-
imposed sentences, in order to avoid transforming the evolving standards of
decency test into a completely subjective standard.68 At other times, it has
emphasized its right to exercise its "own judgment," even when that judg-
ment is relatively unsupported by such "objective indicia" of current stan-
dards of decency. 9 In recent years, the Supreme Court has even shown
64 Id. at 378.
65 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
66 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("An examination of the history and present
operation of the American practice of punishing criminals by death reveals that this punishment has
been almost totally rejected by contemporary society."); id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[The
death penalty] violates the Eighth Amendment because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the
United States at this time in their history.").
67 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
68 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370, 373 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
331 (1989); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
69 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) ("The beginning point is a review of ob-
jective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have ad-
dressed the question.... We then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment,
whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
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willingness to consult controversial alternative sources-such as the policy
preferences of foreign countries and international bodies, as well as private
professional associations-in order to determine what current standards of
decency require."0 Without a clear answer to the "Who decides?" problem,
none of these approaches is clearly right or clearly wrong. As will be dem-
onstrated below, the Court's vagueness in defining its own criteria for
judgment makes the evolving standards of decency test inherently unstable
and thus subject to manipulation.7
The problem deepens when one narrows the focus to the two most
broadly agreed upon "objective indicia" of current moral standards: legisla-
tive enactments and jury verdicts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that the actions of legislatures and juries are the best indicators of current
standards of decency. Legislatures are composed of the people's represen-
tatives and have a vested interest in accurately representing the commu-
nity's moral standards in the legislation they adopt.7 Similarly, juries are
composed of the people themselves, and their collective judgments are
likely to be representative of the community's moral standards. Indeed, in
Witherspoon v. Illinois,73 the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitu-
tional to disqualify jurors solely because they voice general opposition to
the death penalty, since the remaining jurors would fail to represent the
moral standards of society as a whole: "[O]ne of the most important func-
tions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link
between contemporary community values and the penal system-a link
without which the determination of punishment would hardly reflect 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety. '74
Legislative enactments and jury verdicts are an attractive resource for
discerning current moral standards; but once one begins to examine them,
304, 313 (2002) ("[In] cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is 'brought to bear,' by asking
whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators."
(quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1997)).
70 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
71 The Supreme Court's assertion of apparently unrestricted power to exercise its "own judgment"
in determining the permissibility of a given punishment creates significant concerns relating to the sepa-
ration of powers, among other issues. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judi-
cial Discretion, and the Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149 (2006).
72 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175-76 ("[lI]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted
to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))); see also, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371;
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300.
73 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
74 Id. at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). The Supreme Court subse-
quently modified (and weakened) the standard announced in Witherspoon, holding that "a juror may not
be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
his oath. The State may insist, however, that jurors will consider and decide the facts impartially and
conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court." Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,45 (1980).
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one discovers that they are remarkably opaque and resistant to authoritative
moral interpretation. If juries sentence rapists to imprisonment rather than
death in nine cases out of ten, does this mean that jurors overwhelmingly
reject the death penalty for rape? Or does it mean that juries are going
through a nuanced discernment process and are only sentencing defendants
to death in the very worst cases?75 Or does it mean that the juries are engag-
ing in racial discrimination and punishing black defendants to death while
merely sending white defendants to prison?76 Legislative enactments are
almost as difficult to decipher.77 If a state legislature imposes the death
penalty for murder but not for rape, does this mean that the legislature mor-
ally condemns the death penalty for rape? Or might such legislation reflect
a relatively weak policy preference? Might it merely reflect the pragmatic
judgment that imposition of the death penalty for rape is likely to be struck
down by the Supreme Court?" Because the moral import of legislative
judgments and jury verdicts is so difficult to discern, these "objective indi-
cia" of current standards of decency are inherently-and perhaps unavoid-
ably-subject to manipulation.79
3. Public Opinion and Individual Rights.-Leaving aside these meth-
odological problems, the evolving standards of decency test also suffers
from a deeper theoretical problem, in that it appears to make the rights of
75 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 ("[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sen-
tence does not indicate rejection of capital punishment per se. Rather, the reluctance of juries in many
cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the humane feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions
should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.").
76 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Remembering Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment, 83 VA. L. REV.
693 (1997) (reviewing ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE, AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1995)).
77 For an interesting discussion of several types of incoherence surrounding the Supreme Court's ef-
forts to decipher the moral significance of legislative enactments, see Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unravel-
ing of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National
Consensus, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1089 (2006).
78 The difficulty of this problem may be seen in Coker v. Georgia, in which the Supreme Court
struck down Georgia's statute authorizing the death penalty for rape. 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). In
making this decision, the Court relied on the fact that Georgia was the only state that still authorized the
death penalty for the crime of simple rape. Id at 595-96. But prior to the Court's decision in Furman
striking down all then-extant state death penalty laws, some sixteen states still authorized the death pen-
alty for rape. Id. at 593. Furman was decided in 1972, a mere five years prior to Coker. It is not at all
clear why most of the states that had imposed the death penalty for rape prior to Furman declined to do
so when they reenacted their death penalty laws after Furman. Some may have considered Furman an
opportunity to refine their death penalty statutes in light of contemporary standards of decency, but oth-
ers may have excluded rape to make their death penalty statutes narrower and thus less vulnerable to be-
ing struck down again. Thus, the Court's reliance on post-Furman actions of state legislatures as an
index of current standards of decency is questionable.
79 Cf Susan Racker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme
Court's Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 456-57
(1996) (arguing that the manipulability of the evolving standards of decency test has permitted the Su-
preme Court to slant its rulings to favor the death penalty).
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criminal defendants dependent upon public opinion. Individual rights-the
right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech, for example-
are typically thought to be necessary to protect unpopular individuals or
groups when public opinion becomes enflamed against them.8" By contrast,
the evolving standards of decency test only lets the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause come into play after public opinion has already turned in
favor of, not against, criminal defendants.' Thus, for example, in Coker v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court justified striking down the death penalty for
simple rape largely because forty-nine states had already eliminated it. 2
Similarly, in Atkins and Roper, the Court justified its decisions to strike
down the death penalty for the mentally retarded and for minors largely on
the basis that there was already a "trend" in state legislatures toward aboli-
tion. 3
Because the evolving standards of decency test ties the meaning of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to public opinion, the Eighth
Amendment provides little protection when public opinion becomes en-
flamed and more prone to cruelty. For example, in recent years a number of
states have enacted laws requiring that sex offenders be chemically cas-
trated,84 despite the fact that castration has been described by the Supreme
80 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose of
a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections."); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 982, at 697 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) ("[A] bill of rights is an important protection
against unjust and oppressive conduct on the part of the majority of the people themselves."); cf United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.").
81 A number of scholars have previously pointed out the cruel irony inherent in the fact that the
evolving standards of decency test ties the rights of criminal defendants to the very same majority opin-
ion from which the Eighth Amendment is supposed to protect them. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 77, at
1113 ("[Djeclaring an action unconstitutional because a significant number of states prohibit the practice
leaves the Supreme Court enforcing constitutional protections only in cases where they are least
needed."); Raeker-Jordan, supra note 79, at 556 (arguing that under the evolving standards of decency
test, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "will degenerate into a tool to validate the whims of the
masses"). But see Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2007) (arguing that "non-
doctrinal majoritarian forces," not the "majoritarian doctrine" underpinning the evolving standards of
decency test, are the primary cause of the Supreme Court's "majoritarian" approach to death penalty
cases).
82 433 U.S. at 595-96.
83 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-16
(2002).
84 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
6-4 (repealed 2006); IOWA CODE § 903B.10 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:538 (2008); MONT.
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Court as a quintessential example of cruel and unusual punishment.85 When
California's chemical castration law was challenged under the Eighth
Amendment, however, the district court suggested that the very popularity
of such laws likely insulated them from Eighth Amendment scrutiny be-
cause it indicated an "emerging" societal consensus in favor of chemical
castration, which indicated that this punishment met current standards of
decency.86
In short, the evolving standards of decency test only operates to invali-
date punishments that are already on the way out. It does virtually nothing
to stop new forms of cruelty that are on the way in, so long as this cruelty is
supported by public opinion.87 Thus, if applied in good faith, the evolving
standards of decency test leads to a Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
that is nearly as much of a dead letter as it would be under Justice Scalia's
originalist approach, discussed below.88
4. The Manipulability of "Evolving Standards of Decency. "-The
evolving standards of decency test has not been applied consistently with its
own premises, but has instead been subjected to fairly transparent manipu-
lation by the Supreme Court. By refusing to answer the "Who decides?"
question, and by refusing to acknowledge the moral opacity of the "objec-
tive indicia" it consults, the Supreme Court has permitted itself to indulge in
CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (2006). OR. REV. STAT. § 144.625(1) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 304.06(lq) (2005-
06); see also Stinneford, supra note 44, at 561-62.
85 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 265 (1972); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377
(1910); see also Stinneford, supra note 44, at 588.
86 People v. Steele, No. C044408, 2004 WL 2897955, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2004). The
Steele court ultimately refrained from deciding the Eighth Amendment issue because it found that the
defendant had waived it. Id.
87 This potentially serious problem showed itself very recently in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
2641 (2008). In Kennedy, the State of Louisiana sought to justify the execution of a child rapist on the
ground that in recent years, five states had enacted capital rape laws for child rapists, which showed a
"consistent direction of change [in societal attitudes] in support of the death penalty for child rape." Id.
at 2656. The Court acknowledged that this was a good argument for supporting a punishment under the
evolving standards of decency test, noting that "[c]onsistent change might counterbalance an otherwise
weak demonstration of [societal] consensus" in favor of a given punishment. Id. Nonetheless, the Court
struck down the punishment, in part because the absolute number of states approving of this punishment
was too small to support the argument that societal attitudes are consistently moving toward approval.
Id. at 2657-58. Later in the opinion, the Court made clear that its decision was based on the notion that
the death penalty is different than other forms of punishment, id. at 2658 ("Evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society counsel us to be most hesitant before interpreting the
Eighth Amendment to allow the extension of the death penalty."), and that therefore the Court will be
more willing to step in and prevent the emergence of a societal consensus in favor of a particular appli-
cation of the death penalty than it would be in non-death penalty contexts. See id at 2665 (noting that
the evolving standards of decency principle "requires that use of the death penalty be restrained"). Thus,
it appears that, outside of the death penalty context, the evolving standards of decency test continues to
provide little protection against new -forms of penal cruelty, so long as they are popular.
See infra Part ll.B.
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an extraordinarily results-oriented approach to the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause.
This problem may be demonstrated in the Supreme Court's treatment
of whether execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment." In 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Supreme
Court first considered the question.89 The Court noted that such punish-
ments were permissible at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted and
that therefore the only question was whether the punishment ran afoul of
evolving standards of decency. 9 To answer this question, the Court looked
at legislative enactments and jury verdicts. With respect to legislative en-
actments, the Court found that of the thirty-seven states that permitted the
death penalty, twenty-two allowed it to be imposed on sixteen-year-olds
and twenty-five permitted it to be imposed on seventeen-year-olds." The
court further noted that about two percent of all cases in which the death
penalty had been imposed involved defendants who were under eighteen at
the time of the offense.92 Taken together, the Court found these statistics
failed to show that a societal consensus had developed against the execution
of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. 93 A majority of death penalty states
permitted the punishment, and juries continued to impose it. The relative
rarity of such jury verdicts did not indicate that such executions were "cate-
gorically unacceptable" to juries and prosecutors, but rather reflected the
belief that such executions should "rarely" be imposed.94
The permissibility of executing seventeen-year-olds was presented
once again sixteen years later, in Roper v. Simmons.95 In the intervening
years, four state legislatures abolished the death penalty for minors and one
state court did so as a matter of statutory construction.96 The Supreme
Court held that this five-state shift, which still left twenty states authorizing
the death penalty for seventeen-year-olds, demonstrated a "societal consen-
sus" against such executions.97 To bolster its conclusion, the Court noted
that the majority of states did not permit execution of seventeen-year-olds
(although the majority of death penalty states still did), and that the direc-
tion of change was consistently toward abolition.98 The Court also held that
such executions were impermissible in the Court's "own independent
89 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
90 Id. at 369.
91 Id. at 370-71.
92 Id. at 373-74.
93 Id. at 380.
94 ld. at 374.
95 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
96 Id. at 565; see also State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (Wash. 1993) (construing the state of
Washington's death penalty statute not to cover juveniles convicted of capital offenses).
97 Roper, 543 U.S. at 567-68.
98 Id. at 567.
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judgment,"99 because younger people were generally more impulsive, more
vulnerable, and less reflective than older people. Therefore, the Court rea-
soned, young people were generally less culpable."° Finally, the Court
cited the fact that the death penalty for juveniles had been abolished in nu-
merous foreign countries and disapproved in international human rights
treaties-although the United States had not bound itself to any treaty pro-
visions condemning this punishment.'
The differing outcomes in Stanford and Roper demonstrate the inherent
instability and manipulability of the evolving standards of decency test. In
both cases, a substantial proportion of state legislatures permitted execution
of seventeen-year-olds, while a substantial proportion did not. In both
cases, the evidence indicated that juries consistently but rarely imposed the
death sentence on juvenile offenders. Any change in societal attitudes be-
tween Stanford and Roper was incremental at best; in both cases societal at-
titudes about the acceptability of executing seventeen-year-olds were split
nearly down the middle.
The only real difference between these cases lies not in any "evolu-
tion" of societal standards, but in an increased assertiveness of judicial will.
The Roper majority wanted to strike down the death penalty for seventeen-
year-olds, despite the fact that the evidence did not demonstrate that such
executions violated any societal moral consensus, at least within the United
States, and so it simply pretended that the evidence supported the desired
result. One may like the results of Roper and still find the case profoundly
troubling. If evolving standards of decency is merely window-dressing for
judicial will, then it is not merely an incorrect standard; it is not a standard
at all. In the long run, a standardless standard will cause more harm than
good to those criminal defendants who seek the protection of the Eighth
Amendment. 02
B. Dead Letters: Justice Scalia ' Originalist Reading
of the Eighth Amendment
If the Supreme Court's nonoriginalist majority has adopted an unduly
expansive reading of the Eighth Amendment, its dissenters, particularly Jus-
tice Scalia, have adopted a much more restrictive reading of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause than the historical evidence warrants. Like
the nonoriginalists, Justice Scalia has virtually read the word "unusual" out
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in order to justify his position
that the clause was meant only to prohibit certain inherently cruel methods
99 Id. at 564.
10 Id. at 568-75.
'O' Id. at 575-78.
102 For an excellent discussion of the problems inherent in grounding constitutional analysis purely
on contemporary-and perhaps transitory-moral sentiment, see Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt
Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLIJM. L. REv. 1418 (1981).
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of punishment that were already unacceptable in eighteenth-century Amer-
ica.
Justice Scalia's vision of the original meaning of the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause is set out most fully in his opinion in Harmelin v.
Michigan. 3 In that case, the petitioner was convicted of possessing 672
grams of crack cocaine and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life im-
prisonment. The petitioner argued that the sentence was unconstitutional
because it was grossly disproportionate to his offense, and because its man-
datory nature prevented the trial court from taking into account mitigating
factors, such as his lack of a prior felony record."° In a judgment an-
nounced by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court rejected Harmelin's claim,
holding that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense,
and that the Constitution did not invalidate mandatory sentencing outside of
the death penalty context."5 But in a portion of the opinion joined only by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia went further and argued that the
Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality principle whatsoever. °6
To support this argument, Justice Scalia laid out his understanding of the
original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The fol-
lowing sections will describe the historical materials upon which Justice
Scalia relied in discerning the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, and will demonstrate that certain flaws in his approach
to these materials have led him to adopt an unduly harsh and narrow read-
ing of the Clause-indeed, a reading so harsh and narrow that Justice Scalia
has professed himself unwilling to follow it in every case. Because much
of Justice Scalia's interpretation of the historical materials is consistent with
my own, I will only differentiate between his view and mine where there is
actual divergence.
1. The Background for Justice Scalia's Originalist Argument.-
Justice Scalia's opinion was primarily written as a response to the Supreme
Court's prior holding, in Solem v. Helm, that the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause required some proportionality between crime and sen-
tence. 7 As Justice Scalia pointed out in Harmelin, the Solem Court
performed only a cursory historical analysis to justify its holding. It noted
that the language of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause came from the English Bill of Rights 8 It also noted that the
English common law had long reflected a principle of proportionality. 9
The Magna Carta required that "amercements," a form of fine that was the
103 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
104 Id. at 961-62, 994.
1o5 Id. at 994-96.
106 Id. at 965.
107 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
108 Id. at 285.
109 Id. at 284.
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most common criminal punishment in the thirteenth century, be propor-
tioned to the offense. "' Similarly, English common law courts held that
"imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the of-
fence."'' . Having established these two points, it asserted that the English
Bill of Rights' prohibitions against "excessive Baile," "excessive Fines,"
and "cruell and unusuall Punishments," were all meant to incorporate the
principle of proportionality."2 It further asserted that because the American
Framers of the Bill of Rights were generally concerned with preserving the
"rights of English subjects," they must have meant to incorporate the pro-
portionality principle into the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.'
In order to demonstrate the weakness of the Solem Court's assertions,
Justice Scalia performed two historical analyses in Harmelin: first, of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the English Bill of Rights, and
then, of the same in the Eighth Amendment. His analysis is compelling in
many ways, but it is also deeply-even fatally-flawed.
2. Titus Oates and Cruel and Unusual Punishments in the English
Bill of Rights.-Before discussing the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause in the Eighth Amendment, Justice Scalia de-
scribed the historical background of this clause in the English Bill of
Rights, from which the American version was taken." 4
In 1688, in response to a variety of issues that had caused the English
governing class to be unhappy with King James II, a group of nobility in-
vited William of Orange and his wife Mary to invade England and depose
James. William and Mary accepted the invitation and James fled England
after putting up relatively little fight. William then convened a Convention
Parliament in 1689 to decide upon succession to the throne. Parliament de-
clared that by fleeing, James had abdicated the throne and that William and
Mary were the rightful King and Queen of England."'
In conferring the crown upon William and Mary, however, Parliament
also asked them to accept a Bill of Rights that was designed to limit the ar-
11O Id.
Id. at 284-85.
112 Id. at 285-86 ("Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond
the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing
proof that they intended to provide at least the same protection-including the right to be free from ex-
cessive punishments.").
"13 Id. at 286.
114 The discussion that follows will largely track Justice Scalia's, although other sources are also
cited to provide context or highlight important points. As noted above, I will only differentiate between
Justice Scalia's reading of these materials and my own where there is an actual point of divergence or
disagreement.
115 These events have been recounted by numerous sources. See, e.g., SIR DAVID LINDSAY KEIR,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 267-68 (9th ed. 1969); THOMAS
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bitrary exercise of the monarch's prerogative power."' The first part of the
Bill of Rights complains of James II's purportedly lawless behavior, sus-
pending laws by royal prerogative, creating new prerogative courts, levying
taxes without the consent of Parliament, keeping a standing army in time of
peace, billeting soldiers in the homes of subjects, interfering with Parlia-
ment in a variety of ways, and imposing "excessive bail," "excessive fines,"
and "illegall and cruell punishments.""' 7  The second part of the Bill of
Rights sets forth the legal principles that the monarch agrees to follow in
the future. For the most part, these are simply a restatement of the princi-
ples James II was alleged to have violated. Instead of forbidding "illegall
and cruell" punishments, however, the Bill of Rights forbids "cruell and
unusuall punishments.""' 8
As Justice Scalia noted in Harmelin, the English Bill of Rights' prohi-
bition on "cruell and unusuall punishments" was tested in 1689, the very
year in which it was enacted. 9 In 1678, an Anglican cleric named Titus
Oates, who had previously been disciplined for drunkenness, theft, and
other criminal behavior, decided to take advantage of prevailing anti-
Catholic sentiment by claiming that he knew of a "popish plot" to assassi-
nate King Charles II. Oates swore out a statement to this effect before a
London magistrate, and ten days later the magistrate was found murdered.
It was assumed that the magistrate had been murdered by members of the
popish plot, and in the hysteria that ensued, some fifteen people who had
been accused by Oates were tried and executed. Oates' story ultimately un-
raveled, however, and it became clear that he had invented this "plot" out of
whole cloth.' 0
In 1685, Charles II died and was succeeded by James II. During that
same year, Titus Oates was indicted and convicted of perjury. 2' Chief Jus-
tice Jeffreys presided over the trial. After Oates was convicted, Jeffreys
lamented the fact that the death penalty was not available for the crime of
perjury, but announced that "it is left to the discretion of the court to inflict
such punishment as they think fit,"'22 so long as the punishment "extend not
to life or member."'23 Oates was then sentenced to a fine of two thousand
marks, pillorying four times a year, and to life imprisonment. He was also
116 See RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 9 (arguing that the English Bill of Rights set forth the "supreme
law of the land, repeating and sanctifying the fundamental principles of English liberty as Englishmen
then conceived them to be").
117 An Act Declareing, supra note 52, at 142-45.
118 Id.
119 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 969-71 (1991).
120 The trials arising out of Oates's false accusations of a popish plot against the king are described
and critiqued in I JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 383-
404 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883). See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969.
121 Titus Oates's perjury trials are recounted in 10 How. St. Tr. 1079-1330 (K.B. 1685).
122 Id. at 1315.
123 Id. at 1314; see also 10 H.C. JOUR. 247; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970.
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defrocked and was ordered to be whipped "from Aldgate to Newgate," and
then "from Newgate to Tybum" two days later.124 As Justice Scalia noted,
some scholars have argued that the court believed it was sentencing Oates
to be "scourged to death."'25
In 1689, after the Bill of Rights was enacted, Oates petitioned both
houses of Parliament for release from judgment. In the House of Lords,
"there was not one Lord but thought the Judgments erroneous, and was
fully satisfied, That such an extravagant Judgment ought not to have been
given, or a Punishment so exorbitant inflicted upon an English subject. "126
Nonetheless, the Lords affirmed the judgment, because they considered
Oates to be "so ill a Man."'2 A minority protested, however, on several
grounds, most of which related to the cruel and unprecedented nature of the
punishments imposed on Oates.'28 The punishments were "contrary to law
and ancient practice."'29 They were "barbarous, inhuman and unchris-
tian."'3 There was "no precedent" to support such punishments, and the
House of Lords' decision to affirm them would create a precedent "for giv-
ing the like cruel, barbarous and illegal Judgments hereafter."'' Finally, the
protesters asserted that the punishments imposed on Oates violated the
command in the Bill of Rights that "excessive bail ought not to be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments in-
flicted."'32
The House of Commons, however, did pass a bill to release Oates from
the judgment.' 3 Representatives from Commons then held a free confer-
ence with the Lords. Echoing the protesters from the House of Lords, the
Commons representatives emphasized the fact that the cruel punishments
imposed on Oates were beyond the bounds established by the common law
and that affirmance of these punishments would set a precedent for even
greater cruelty in the future. It was of "ill example" for a temporal court to
exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction by defrocking a cleric.' It was of "ill
example, and illegal" to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without
express statutory authorization because there was no common law prece-
124 10 How. St. Tr. at 1315-16; see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970.
125 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (quoting 2 T. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 204 (1899)).
126 10 H.C. JOUR. 249 (1689).
127 Id.
128 The protesters also expressed doubt about the validity of Oates' conviction, and argued that the





133 10 H.C. JouR. 246 (1689); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 971 (1991).
134 10 H.C. JOUR. 247 (1689).
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dent to support such a punishment.'35 It was "of ill example, and unusual"
to sentence an Englishman to undergo pillorying four times a year for life.'36
It was "illegal, cruel, and of dangerous example" to impose such a severe
whipping on an offender that it would likely result in death.'37 Moreover,
the Commons representatives emphasized that Oates's punishment violated
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the newly enacted Bill of
Rights. The House of Commons had a "particular regard" to Oates's sen-
tence-among others-when it drafted the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments.'38 If his punishment were affirmed, this would strip the pro-
hibition of its meaning and eviscerate the "ancient Right of the People of
England that they should not be subjected to cruel and unusual Punish-
ments."'39
As Justice Scalia noted, the primary thrust of the argument that Oates's
punishment was "cruel and unusual" was that it was contrary to prece-
dent."' There was "no precedent to warrant" such punishments.' They
were "contrary to law and ancient practice." '142 Moreover, if allowed, such
punishments would set a bad precedent for the future. They were an "ill
135 Id. ("[lit was of ill Example, and illegal, That a Judgment of perpetual Imprisonment should be
given in a Case, where there is no express Law to warrant it."). This statement has led some commenta-
tors to conclude that under the English Bill of Rights, a punishment could only be cruel and unusual if it
was both contrary to precedent and unauthorized by statute and that therefore the English version of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause must not have been meant as a constraint on the power of the
legislature to define punishments. See, e.g., Granucci, supra note 31, at 859. Such a reading, however,
ignores the context in which the statement was made. Because perpetual imprisonment was not a pun-
ishment known at common law, and was also not authorized by statute, the House of Commons asserted
in this statement that the judges in Titus Oates's case overstepped their authority by making up a new
and unauthorized punishment. The Commons was not considering, however, whether the common law
imposed any limit on the power of Parliament to create new punishments. As Part III, infra, will dem-
onstrate, many prominent English legal figures-including Edward Coke and at least three subsequent
Chief Justices-took the position that Parliament lacked the power to enact laws contrary to fundamen-
tal principles of justice embodied in the common law. See infra Part III.B.3, 5. Although this position
was controversial in England, it was taken as a fundamental truth by the American colonists who pro-
tested Parliament's various violations of common law principles in the run-up to the American Revolu-
tion. See infra Part III.D.2. Moreover, the evidence is clear that the founding generation saw the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause in the Eighth Amendment as being primarily designed to keep both
Congress and individual judges within the constraints imposed by longstanding common law precedent.
See infra Part III.E-F.
136 10 H.C. JOUR. 247 (1689) ("It was of ill Example, and unusual, That an Englishman should be
exposed upon a Pillory, so many times a Year, during his Life.").
137 Id. ("[I]t was illegal, cruel, and of dangerous Example, That a Freeman should be whipped in
such a barbarous manner as, in probability, would determine in Death.").
138 Id. ("[T]he Commons had a particular Regard to these Judgments, amongst others, when that
Declaration [the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] was first made; and must insist upon it, That
they are erroneous, cruel, illegal, and of ill Example to future Ages.").
139 Id.
140 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 974 (1991).
141 14 H.L. JOUR. 228 (1689).
142 Id.
1762
The Original Meaning of "Unusual"
example,"' 43 a "dangerous example,"'" and would ultimately be of "perni-
cious consequence to the People."'45 After reviewing this history, Justice
Scalia concluded that the words "illegal" and "unusual" in the English Bill
of Rights were
identical for practical purposes. Not all punishments were specified by statute;
many were determined by the common law. Departures from the common law
were lawful only if authorized by statute .... A requirement that punishment
not be "unusuall"-that is, not contrary to "usage" (Lat. "usus") ... or "prece-
dent"-was primarily a requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain
within the bounds of the common law tradition.'46
Finally, Justice Scalia contended that Parliament could not have intended to
outlaw disproportionate punishments in the English Bill of Rights.'47 He
reasoned that the problem with Oates's punishment was not that it was dis-
proportionate; in fact, the punishment was arguably proportionate to
Oates's actual moral desert because Oates's actions amounted to the pre-
meditated killing of fifteen innocent people.'48 Rather, the problem was that
the punishment was contrary to common law precedent."'
Justice Scalia's historical account is highly persuasive, as far as it goes.
However, Justice Scalia inadvertently distorted the meaning of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause by mistakenly contrasting the word "un-
usual" with "usage" rather than "long usage" or "immemorial usage." As I
will demonstrate below in Part III an "unusual" punishment does not simply
violate precedent; it violates longstanding precedent. 5 ° It is contrary to
"law and ancient practice," and is thus presumptively incompatible with the
reasonable customs and traditions of the people.' The distinction between
"usage" and "long usage" has significant consequences for Justice Scalia's
analysis of the American situation, as will be shown in the next section.
3. Justice Scalia's Erasure of "Unusual" in the Eighth Amend-
ment.-Justice Scalia's analysis in Harmelin of the American version of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is much more problematic than his
account of the English Bill of Rights. Once Justice Scalia's opinion moves
from seventeenth-century England to eighteenth-century America, it aban-
dons any attempt to discern whether the founding generation of Americans
shared the same understanding of the meaning of the word "unusual" as did
143 10 H.C. JOUR. 247 (1689).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 974 (1991).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 973 n.4.
149 Id. at 974.
150 See infra Part III.A.
151 See infra Part IlI.B.
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their English counterparts. Rather, Justice Scalia simply asserted that it
would not make sense for "unusual" to have the same meaning in America
as in England because federal punishments were defined by statute, not
common law:
Wrenched out of its common law context, and applied to the actions of a
legislature, the word "unusual" could hardly mean "contrary to law." But it
continued to mean (as it continues to mean today) "such as [does not] occu[r]
in ordinary practice," "[s]uch as is [not] in common use." According to its
terms, then, by forbidding "cruel and unusual punishments," the Clause dis-
ables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or "modes" of punish-
ment-specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or
customarily employed.1
52
This argument is a strange one to see in the middle of an historical analysis
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, for it eschews any historical
analysis of the founding generation's actual understanding of the word "un-
usual" and relies solely on abstract logic. It moves from major premise (in
the English Bill of Rights, "unusual" meant "illegal") to minor premise
(every punishment authorized by a legislature must, by definition, be "le-
gal") to conclusion (the word "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment cannot
mean the same thing it did in the English Bill of Rights, because the Eighth
Amendment applies to legislatures as well as judges). Justice Scalia's ar-
gument fails, however, as a matter of logic and of history.
Justice Scalia's major premise is incorrect because the word "unusual"
in seventeenth-century England was not identical to the word "illegal," al-
though there certainly was substantial overlap between the two words. As
shown below-and indeed, as Justice Scalia's own analysis tends to
show-"unusual" meant "contrary to long usage," that is, contrary to long-
standing common law precedent.'53 "Illegal," on the other hand, meant
"contrary to law." Where the law requires judges to follow longstanding
precedent in imposing a sentence, then a given sentence can be illegal by
virtue of being unusual. But where the law does not require judges to fol-
low longstanding precedent-for example, where a court follows a new
statute that calls for the imposition of a less severe punishment for a given
crime than was imposed at common law-the sentence can be unusual
without being illegal. As Justice Scalia himself observed, the Parliament of
1689 was primarily concerned about royal judges--especially Chief Justice
Jeffreys--devising new or unprecedented punishments in a manner forbid-
den by law.'54 The punishments the judges imposed were "unusual" be-
cause they were innovations, and were "illegal" because the law forbade
judges from cruel innovation in punishment. Under these circumstances, it
152 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976 (citations omitted).
153 See infra Part I.A.
154 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 ("Jeffreys was widely accused of 'inventing' special penalties for the
King's enemies, penalties that were not authorized by common-law precedent or statute.").
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was perfectly appropriate and logical for the English Bill of Rights to use
both the phrases "cruel and illegal" and "cruel and unusual" to describe the
punishments it sought to condemn. But this does not mean that the words
"unusual" and "illegal" were equivalent.
The minor premise is incorrect because it was quite possible in the
eighteenth century for a punishment authorized by the legislature to be con-
sidered "unusual" because it violated longstanding precedent. As shown
below, numerous American legal and political thinkers-as well as a num-
ber of English lawyers and statesmen-during this time period argued that
Parliament lacked the power to enact laws contrary to the fundamental prin-
ciples of reason embodied in the common law. 55 When Parliament did so
in the 1760s and 1770s, American revolutionaries claimed that Parliament's
actions were "unusual," and therefore void. 6 Indeed, one of the primary
reasons for the enactment of the American Bill of Rights was the removal
from Congress of any hint of power to violate certain fundamental princi-
ples embodied in the common law, including the ancient right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishments. 57
4. A Problem of Principle: Faint-Hearted Originalists and Eight-
eenth-Century Standards of Cruelty.-In a speech he delivered to the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati Law School in 1989, Justice Scalia'described the
dilemma faced by an originalist when confronted with a constitutional pro-
vision whose original meaning seems starkly at odds with contemporary
values. Justice Scalia chose the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as
his example:
What if some state should enact a new law providing public lashing, or brand-
ing of the right hand, as punishment for certain criminal offenses? Even if it
could be demonstrated unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual
measures in 1791, and even though no prior Supreme Court decision has spe-
cifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any federal judge-even among
the many who consider themselves originalists-would sustain them against
an [E]ighth [A]mendment challenge .... [A]ny espousal of originalism as a
practical theory of exegesis must somehow come to terms with that reality.'58
In this passage, Justice Scalia acknowledges the force of the problem that
led a majority of his colleagues to adopt the evolving standards of decency
test for interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Some pun-
ishments that were acceptable at the end of the eighteenth century seem so
harsh by modem standards that it is hard to imagine any court upholding
them. Indeed, with admirable honesty, Justice Scalia acknowledges that he
himself might have to part with his originalist principles if faced with such
155 See infra Part III.A.5, D.2.
156 See infra Part II1.D.2.
157 See infra Part III.E.
158 Scalia, supra note 24, at 861.
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a case: "I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted
originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge,
upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging." '159
Generous though he is in making this acknowledgement, Justice Scalia
has, by doing so, abandoned any pretext that his approach to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause is more principled than the evolving standards
of decency approach. If we are to follow the original meaning of the Clause
in most-but not all--cases, how do we determine which cases get which
treatment? Justice Scalia finds that modem sensibilities must trump origi-
nal meaning with respect to flogging and hand-branding, but thinks that
original meaning should prevail with respect to the death penalty, for ex-
ample. 6 Justices Brennan and Marshall vehemently argued that modem
sensibilities should trump original meaning with respect to the death pen-
alty. 6  Who is right? What principle do we use to determine which pun-
ishments should be evaluated according to original meaning, and which
should get the benefit of "evolving standards of decency"? There is no an-
swer to this question other than judicial will. Ultimately, Justice Scalia's
position suffers from the very same shortcomings that plague the evolving
standards of decency test.
In Part III, I will demonstrate the original meaning of the word "un-
usual"-a word that has been largely ignored by the Supreme Court's nono-
riginalist majority and originalist dissent. In Part IV, I will show that
recognition of the original meaning of "unusual" will make the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause stronger, more coherent, and more stable than
the current approaches taken by the Court.
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF "UNUSUAL"
When scholars discuss the original meaning of a constitutional provi-
sion, they generally focus on the "original public meaning"162-the meaning
that would have been inferred by readers of the text at the time of its enact-
ment.'63 Original meaning questions arise most often when a constitutional
provision is either ambiguous or vague. An ambiguous provision is one
that is capable of several possible meanings." A vague provision, by con-
trast, has a single but relatively "fuzzy" meaning. Vagueness questions
159 Id. at 864.
160 See supra note 20.
161 See supra note 66.
162 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 105
(2004).
163 See, e.g., id; Scalia, supra note 18, at 17. But see Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A
Critical Analysis ofAharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOzO L. REv. 1109 (2008)
(arguing for a theory of original meaning based on the subjective intent of the Framers, rather than
merely the public meaning of the terms they employed).
164 See BARNETr, supra note 162, at 119.
1766
The Original Meaning of "Unusual"
generally arise when there is a question as to whether a particular object
comes within the scope of the vague term's application.'65
Until now, the Supreme Court has treated the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause as though it presents two distinct but interrelated vague-
ness problems. First, as Part II demonstrates, both the originalists and the
nonoriginalists on the Court treat the word "unusual" as being too vague to
play any significant role in determining the meaning of the clause. Second,
both groups treat what is left of the clause, the bare prohibition on "cruel
punishments," as a vague but not completely indeterminate provision,
whose scope is the source of constant skirmishing: Is the execution of mi-
nors a "cruel punishment," or is it not? What about the execution of the
mentally retarded? What about life sentences for smalltime recidivists?
Because the skirmishes over these issues are simply battles about the scope
of a vague prohibition, their results have depended on little more than the
ever-shifting composition of the Court itself.
In the two Parts that follow, I demonstrate that the central problem un-
derlying the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence
is not a double vagueness problem. Rather, it is a previously unrecognized
ambiguity problem. At the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, the term
"unusual" had at least two possible meanings: "out of the ordinary" and
"contrary to long usage." Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not only
chosen the wrong meaning by construing the term to mean "out of the ordi-
nary," it has failed even to recognize the existence of the correct meaning:
"contrary to long usage." As a result, what should be a relatively determi-
nate constitutional provision has been treated as though it were impossibly
vague. In this Part, I demonstrate that the original meaning of the word
"unusual" in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was "contrary to
long usage," not "out of the ordinary." In Part IV, I show that resolution of
this ambiguity also goes a long way toward resolving the vagueness prob-
lem inherent in the Court's current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The
result is a Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that is both stronger and
more coherent.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the term "unusual" had
many of the meanings we currently associate with the term: "rare," "un-
common," "out of the ordinary." '166 The word also had a more specific
meaning, however, as a legal term of art: "contrary to long usage" or "im-
memorial usage." A review of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal
and political history shows that this last meaning is the only one that may
165 Seeid. at 118-19.
166 The Oxford English Dictionary contains several examples in which the word "unusual" was
given one of these meanings during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: "1682 LISTER Godartius
Of Insects 28 This is a Rare and unusuall Catterpillar. 1724 SWIFT Drapier's Lett. iv, A new governor,
coming at an unusual time, must portend some unusual business. 1773 Life N. Frowde 56, 1 returned to
my Book.., in a Situation quite unusual to what I had ever before experienced." OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 249 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for "unusual").
1767
102:1739 (2008)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
plausibly be attributed to the term "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. To demonstrate this point, this
Part moves from the descriptive, to the normative, to the historical. Section
A shows how the terms "long usage," "use," "usual," and "unusual" were
employed by English and American legal and political thinkers to describe
the nature and function of the common law. Sections B and C show how
Edward Coke and William Blackstone used "long usage" as the primary
measuring stick for determining whether a given governmental practice ac-
corded with principles of reason and justice. Both Coke and Blackstone
contrasted the "reasonable" punishment practices associated with the com-
mon law with cruel innovations imposed by the king and by Parliament.
Sections D and E show that the founding generation of Americans shared
the English conception of the normative power of "long usage" and repeat-
edly used the term "unusual" to describe government actions that were con-
trary to fundamental principles of justice embodied in the common law.
Finally, section F surveys American caselaw from the enactment of the
Eighth Amendment through the first half of the nineteenth century, and
demonstrates that American courts consistently interpreted "unusual" to
mean contrary to the long usage of the common law.
A. Long Usage, Use, Usual, and Unusual
In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and eighteenth-century
America, the most important source of law was the common law. Black-
stone described it as "the first ground and chief corner stone of the laws of
England." '167 But what is the common law? Or more precisely, what did the
English and American jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
believe it to be?
Today, we tend to see the common law as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
and his contemporaries described it: a body of judge-made law, in which
judges-acting within a broad framework of precedent-formulate legal
principles that adapt to the changing circumstances of the times. In
Holmes's words, common law judges exercise a "legislative function,"
formulating legal rules and principles based on their views of "what is ex-
pedient for the community concerned."' 68
Those who practiced and wrote about the common law in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries had a decidedly different perspective. The
common law was not regarded as judge-made law, but rather as customary
law, the law of "long use" and "custom."'69 Common law judges did not
167 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *73.
168 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). For a fas-
cinating analysis of Oliver Wendell Holmes's impact on modem jurisprudence, see ALBERT
ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000).
169 EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER (1630) [hereinafter COKE, COPYHOLDER], as re-
printed in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE § 33, at 563, 563 (Steve
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see themselves as formulating public policy, but rather as identifying long-
standing customary rules and applying them to particular cases. 7 ' Black-
stone called these customary rules the leges non scriptae-the unwritten
law of England.'7'
In English and American legal thought, the terms "custom" and "long
usage" were tied closely together as a matter of both logic and grammar.
Whereas today we normally say that we "follow" a custom, it was more
common in the seventeenth and eighteenth century to say that we "use" a
custom. Thus, for example, Edward Coke wrote: "And note that no cus-
tome is to bee allowed, but such custome as hath bin used by title of pre-
scription, that is to say, from time out of minde."'72 A century and a half
later, William Blackstone wrote that "in our law the goodness of a custom
depends upon it's [sic] having been used time out of mind; or, in the solem-
nity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary."'73  Similarly, in America, James Wilson--one of the primary
drafters of the United States Constitution-wrote: "[L]ong customs, ap-
proved by the consent of those who use them, acquire the qualities of a
law."1
74
Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS] ("Customes are defined to be a Law, or
Right not written, which being established by long use, and the consent of our Ancestors, hath been, and
is daily practised."). The notion that the common law is primarily a law of custom and long usage was
expressed in writing as early as the fourteenth century. See THOMAS USK, TESTAMENT OF LOVE, bk. III,
ch. 1, 11. 78-83 (R. Allen Shoaf ed., Medieval Inst. Pub. 1998) (c. 1380) ("But custome is a thyng that is
accepted for right or for lawe, there as lawe and right faylen .... [C]ustome is of commen usage by
length of tyme used, and custome nat writte is usage; and if it be writte, constitutyon it is ywritten and
ycleped."); see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 167-68 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "custom" as "[a]
habitual or usual practice; common way of acting; usage, fashion, habit (either of an individual or of a
community)").
170 As Grant Gilmore and many others have observed, the idea that common law judges merely
identified and applied longstanding custom was not entirely true by the end of the eighteenth century
and may never have been entirely true. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 5-7
(1977). For example, Gilmore argues that in response to the industrial revolution and the vast increase
in the volume and complexity of commercial transactions, Lord Mansfield and other English judges at
the end of the eighteenth century "were making law, new law, with a sort of joyous frenzy." Id. None-
theless, as the discussion below indicates, the common law was celebrated in seventeenth- and eight-
eenth-century England and America for its capacity simultaneously to adapt to changing circumstances
while resisting governmental innovations, particularly innovations that tended to exalt the power of the
state at the expense of individual liberty. The common law's capacity to resist innovations like these
derived from its dependence on "long use and custom" as a primary source of normative and actual au-
thority. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 186 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan &
Co. 1896); see also infra Part III.B; cf Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (emphasizing
the common law's capacity to adapt to new circumstances as a source of its normative power).
17l I BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *64.
172 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608) [hereinafter COKE,
INSTITUTES], as reprinted in 2 COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 169, § 170, at 701.
173 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *67.
174 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 170, at 435-36.
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The binding authority of long usage applied both to private parties and
to the government. With respect to private parties, long usage served to
identify rights and duties. For example, where the tenant of a farm had con-
tinuously crossed another's land by "immemorial usage," that tenant devel-
oped a right of way across the land. 75 With respect to the government, on
the other hand, long usage served as a basis and justification for state ac-
tion, such as the imposition of a given punishment for a given crime. For
example, Blackstone notes that it was an "ancient usage among the Goths"
to punish a murder committed in secret by imposing a heavy amercement
on the entire community in which it was committed.
76
Actions that comported with long usage were often said to be "usual."
For example, the customary rules regarding royal succession were described
as the "usual course of descent.' 1 7 Mercantile towns that sent representa-
tives to Parliament were expected to pay the "usual" fee to cover the ex-
pense of maintaining their representatives.'78 New laws were supposed to
be announced to the public according to the "usual" manner.'79
Actions that were contrary to long usage, on the other hand, were de-
scribed as "unusual." It was a violation of Magna Carta for the king to de-
mand an "unusual" fee for issuing a royal writ. 8° A sheriff could be
indicted for holding a Tom in an "unusual" place. 8' An individual could be
found guilty of the crime of affray for going about in public with "un-
usual"-that is, more than customary-weapons and attendance.'82 During
the development of the English feudal system, the lord of the manor lost the
ability to interfere with the passage of an interest in land-a "feud"-from a
feudatory to his heir because such interference became "unusual," that is,
contrary to customary practice."8 3 Conversely, the feudatory lacked any
right to transfer his property interest without the consent of the lord, even
by prescribing an "unusual path of descent" in his will; rather, the feud had
to go to the feudatory's heir as determined under the "usual," customary
line of descent. 184
As we will see below, Americans in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries also used the term "unusual" to describe actions that were
contrary to "long usage." For example, in 1769 the Virginia House of Bur-
gesses described Parliament's attempt to revive a long-defunct statute that
175 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *36.
176 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at * 195.
177 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *215.
178 Id. at *174.
179 Id. at *46.
180 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *273.
181 See 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 91 (John Curwood ed.,
London, S. Sweet 1824).
182 See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at * 148, *254-55; 1 HAWKINS, supra note 181, at 488.
183 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *55-56.
184 Id. at *287.
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would permit the trial of American protesters in England as "new, unusual,
... unconstitutional and illegal."' 85 In the Declaration of Independence, the
Continental Congress complained of the recent English practice of calling
colonial legislatures at "places unusual."'86 In 1788, George Mason worried
that the lack of common law constraints in the new Constitution would
permit Congress to create "new crimes, inflict unusual and severe punish-
ments, and extend their powers."'' 7 Similarly, Patrick Henry argued that
because the new federal government would not be bound by the common
law, it would be nothing more than a series of "new and unusual experi-
ments."'88 Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, American
courts that were called upon to determine whether a punishment was "cruel
and unusual" almost invariably noted that a punishment could only be "un-
usual" if it was contrary to the long usage of the common law.'89
Of course, these American examples differ from the English examples
cited above in that they use the word "unusual" to denote government ac-
tions that were not merely contrary to long usage, but also fundamentally
unjust. How the word "unusual" came to acquire this connotation will be
discussed in the following sections, which describe the normative power of
"long usage" and its practical role in the development of the English and
American constitutional systems.
B. The Importance of Being "Usual": Edward Coke and the
Normative Power of "Long Usage"
Edward Coke has been described as the most important common law
jurist in English history. As one scholar has proclaimed, "Coke's works
have been to the common law what Shakespeare has been to literature, and
the King James Bible to religion."19 Coke's career, which included promi-
nent roles as a lawyer, judge, and Parliamentary leader, began during the
reign of Elizabeth I, continued through the reign of James I, and concluded
185 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES, supra note 36, at 215.
186 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 6 (U.S. 1776). This complaint in the Declaration of
Independence is strongly reminiscent of the common law principle, mentioned immediately above, that
sheriffs were not permitted to hold Toms-a kind of local court-in "unusual" locations, lest the public
be denied its right of access. England's decision to call local legislatures in "unusual," that is, noncus-
tomary, locations thus violated basic common law principles and would arguably be a crime if done by
an individual official.
187 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [here-
inafter FARRAND].
188 Henry, supra note t, at 172.
189 See infra Part III.F.
190 Allen D. Boyer, Introduction to LAW, LIBERTY AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE xiii-xiv (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004) [hereinafter LAW, LIBERTY AND
PARLIAMENT] (citing William Holdsworth); see also id. at xiii ("Wherever the common law has been
applied, Coke's influence has been monumental.").
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well into the ill-fated reign of Charles I. 9  His writings on the common
law, his judicial decisions, and his role in Parliament-particularly his in-
fluence in the drafting of the Petition of Right in 1628-decisively shaped
English thought about the nature and function of the common law over the
next two centuries. 9 2  Coke also had great impact on American legal
thought in the late eighteenth century, where his influence was comparable
to that of William Blackstone-who was himself greatly indebted to
Coke. 193
Coke established several important principles that were the basis for
the common law ideology that would serve, much later, as the principal un-
derpinning for both the American Revolution and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. Specifically, Coke argued that the common law consisted of cus-
tomary practices that enjoyed "long" or "immemorial usage," and that were
therefore inherently just and reasonable.'94 These longstanding practices
were not merely the primary source of positive law in England at that time,
but were also the basis of fundamental individual rights against the state.' 95
Coke further argued that government actions that deviated from long us-
age-in other words, "unusual" actions' 96-were dangerous and presump-
tively unjust. 97 Finally, Coke argued that even acts of Parliament or king
that deviated from fundamental common law principles were "void" be-
cause they were contrary to "common right or reason."'98 Coke did not
identify a remedy for royal or parliamentary deviations from long usage.
Nonetheless, the principles he articulated set the terms of the debate
191 See generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1957).
192 See STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE "GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH,"
1621-1628, at 9-11 (1979); see also infra Part III.B.5, D, E.
193 For example, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "[B]efore the revolution, Coke's Littleton was the uni-
versal elementary book of law students, and a sounder [W]hig never wrote, nor of profounder learning in
the orthodox doctrines of the British [C]onstitution, or in what were called British liberties."
10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 376 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New
York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1899); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56-57 (1955). According to Corwin, two of Coke's most important
contributions to the development of American constitutional law were the notion that an act of Parlia-
ment that violates reason is void, and the notion that a fundamental law, embodied largely in a docu-
ment-in Coke's case, Magna Carta-was binding on both the king and Parliament. See id.
194 See infra Part III.B.I.
195 See infra Part III.B.2.
196 Coke generally described such actions as "innovations" rather than "unusual." See, e.g.,
1 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, § 723, at 740 (comparing "innovations" unfavorably with the long
usage of the common law). As will be shown below, however, later writers, including American revolu-
tionaries and framers of the Bill of Rights, used the terms "innovation," "unusual," and "unconstitu-
tional" interchangeably in describing government violations of rights established by "long usage." See
infra Part III.D-E.
197 See infra Part IH.B.I.
198 See infra Part 111.B.3-4.
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throughout the upheavals of the next 150 years'99 and were crucial both to
the American Revolution and to the adoption of the American Bill of
Rights.0 ° More specifically, the principles Coke articulated demonstrate
why the word "unusual" was included in the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause.2"'
1. Reasonable Common Law Versus Cruel Innovation.-In the sev-
enteenth century, it was generally agreed that the ultimate basis for law was
an objectively real moral order that inhered in nature and was knowable by
reason.20 2 This conception of law, which derived originally from classical
Greek and Roman sources,2 3 was summarized by Thomas Aquinas in the
thirteenth century: "Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes
of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the
eternal. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law,
and has the nature, not of law, but of violence."2 4
Despite the unitary foundation of all law, however, the immediate
sources of the positive law in England were various and sometimes conflict-
ing: custom, statute, decisions of common law courts, civil law courts,
etc.205 Moreover, the Stuart kings under whom Coke served were adherents
of the doctrine of absolute monarchy, which held that the king was the font
of all law and that kings could suspend laws that were not to their liking.20 6
What should be done when there is a conflict between royal will and com-
mon or statutory law? More generally, how does one differentiate genuine
199 See infra Part III.B.5.
200 See infra Part IlI.D-E.
201 See infra Part III.E.
202 See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE
L.J. 1651, 1653 (1993) ("Natural law theory treats law essentially as the embodiment in rules and con-
cepts of moral principles that are derived ultimately from reason and conscience."); see also THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. 1I1-, Q. 90, art. I (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
2d rev. ed. 1920), available at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2090.htm#articlel ("Law is a rule and
measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for 'lex' [law] is derived
from 'ligare' [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the rea-
son, which is the first principle of human acts.").
203 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. 3, ch. 16 (Benjamin Jowett trans.), in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD: THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, VOL. 2, 485 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., 1952) ([H]e
who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds
an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when
they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire."); CICERO, ON THE LAWS 28, in I ON
THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 115 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., 1999) ("[Wle are born for justice,
and ... justice is established not by opinion but by nature.").
204 THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 202, pt. II-I, Q. 93, art. 3, reply 2, available at http://www.
newadvent.org/summa/2093.htm#article3.
205 See Sir John Baker, The Common Lawyers and the Chancery: 1616, reprinted in LAW, LIBERTY,
AND PARLIAMENT, supra note 190, at 254-55.
206 See KING JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES (1598), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, A.D. 1603-1625, at 9-10 (J.R. Tanner ed., 1960).
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law-that is, law that conforms to basic principles of justice-from mere
"violence"?
This difficult and highly charged problem would not work itself out
completely until nearly a century and a half after Coke's death. Nonethe-
less, Coke set forth the basic principles for solving the problem, in a manner
that would be highly influential on the development of the English and
American constitutions, and that would have particular relevance to the
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
As a starting point, Coke agreed with the proposition that basic princi-
ples of justice were built into the natural order itself, asserting that the "law
of nature is part of the law of England.""2 7 Moreover, Coke agreed that the
fundamental basis of law is reason rather than will, and that therefore laws
that violate basic principles of justice may not properly be called "law" at
all: "[N]othing that is contrarie to reason, is consonant to Law."2 8  But
Coke's thought differed from the classical and medieval natural law tradi-
tions in one key respect. Rather than identifying "reason" directly with
universal, abstract principles of justice, Coke identified it with a specific set
of historically and culturally situated legal rules, the common law of Eng-
land: "[R]eason is the life of the Law, nay the common Law it selfe is noth-
ing else but reason."2 9
The key to this identification was Coke's conception of the normative
power of "long usage." If a given customary law was used over a long pe-
riod of time, throughout the entire kingdom, Coke held that this process
confirmed the law's goodness and eliminated from the law anything that
was bad or unreasonable. Thus he compared long usage to the refinement
of gold: "[I]f all the reason that is dispersed into so many severall heads
were united into one, yet could not make such a Law as the Law of England
is, because by many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an
infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long experience growne
to such a perfection, for the government of this Realme."2 °
Coke considered long usage to be the most reliable basis for determin-
ing the goodness of a law because it established both that the law was rea-
207 7 EDWARD COKE, Calvin's Case, or the Case of the Postnati, in REPORTS (1608), as reprinted in
I COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 169, at 166, 195.
208 1 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, § 69, at 684.
209 Id. § 138, at 701.
210 Id. Robert Lowry Clinton has recently described the strength of the common law in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries in strikingly similar terms: "It was not the fabrication of a single individ-
ual or group working at a particular time or place, not a product of abstract reasoning. Rather, it was the
product of countless experiences of both similar and varied kinds across vast reaches of time and space,
absorbing essential continuities in a reality that can be known only historically." ROBERT LOWRY
CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
92 (1997). Edward Corwin has noted that the idea of "immemorial usage as superior to human rule-
making" dates back at least as far as Sophocles and that in England, the common law had been equated
with "right reason" since at least the fourteenth century. CORWIN, supra note 193, at 6, 26.
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sonable, and that it enjoyed the consent of the people. First, as the passage
quoted above indicates, Coke saw long usage as representing a process of
legal development that, like the refinement of gold in a fire, reliably sepa-
rates the good from the bad. As courts decide cases year after year and cen-
tury after century, impractical and unjust legal practices fall away like
dross, while practical and just ones survive. Second, Coke argued that legal
practices that enjoy long usage must also enjoy the consent of the people,
otherwise they would fall out of usage."' This notion-that long usage es-
tablishes both the reasonableness and the consensual nature of the law-
was highly influential and was repeated over the years by William Black-
stone," 2 James Wilson,2"3 and many others.
Just as Coke identified long usage with principles of reason, he at-
tacked innovations in the law as presumptively unreasonable and held that
their falsity could easily be demonstrated by comparing such innovations to
the longstanding rules of the common law:
[W]hen any innovation or new invention starts up,.. . trie it with the Rules of
the common Law, . . . for these be true Touchstones to sever the pure gold
from the drosse and sophistications of novelties and new inventions. And by
this example you may perceive, That the rule of the old common Law being
soundly . . . applied to such novelties, it doth utterly crush them and bring
them to nothing."1 4
The primary innovation Coke had in mind was the importation of civil
law practices from continental Europe into England. As noted above, dur-
ing Coke's time, a variety of different sources of law coexisted in England.
The common law was the oldest and most important source of law, dating
back to pre-Norman times. But because the common law looked to long
usage rather than sovereign will for its rules of decision, it was remarkably
211 See, e.g., COKE, COPYHOLDER supra note 169, § 33, at 563 ("Customes are defined to be a Law
... which being established by long use, and the consent of our Ancestors, hath been, and is daily prac-
ticed.").
212 See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *70, *74.
213 On the capacity of the common law to maintain what is good, discard what is bad, and accom-
modate itself to changing circumstances, Wilson wrote: "It is the characteristic of a system of common
law that it be accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies, and the conveniences of the people,
by whom it is appointed. Now, as these circumstances, and exigencies, and conveniences insensibly
change; a proportionate change, in time and degree, must take place in the accommodated system. But
though the system suffer these partial and successive alterations, yet it continues materially and substan-
tially the same." I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 170, at 435-36. On the relationship be-
tween long usage and consent, Wilson wrote: "Some writers, when they describe that usage, which is the
foundation of common law, characterize it by the epithet immemorial. The parliamentary description is
not so strong. 'Long use and custom' is assigned as the criterion of law, 'taken by the people at their
free liberty, and by their own consent.' And this criterion is surely sufficient to satisfy the principle: for
consent is certainly proved by long, though it be not immemorial usage." Id. at 186.
214 1 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, § 723, at 740.
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difficult for kings to subject to royal control. 15 At least partly for this rea-
son, a number of kings established specialized courts that followed the civil
law practices of continental Europe rather than the common law. These
specialized courts included the Star Chamber, the ecclesiastical Court of
High Commission, and the Admiralty Court, among others.
Although Coke sometimes practiced before civil courts as an attorney,
he came to see the imposition of the foreign practices of the civil law as a
means of undermining the liberty of English subjects protected by the
common law. Indeed, according to Coke, the very first act of those who
wished to introduce the civil law system to England was to bring an instru-
ment of torture-the "Rack"-into the Tower of London for use on prison-
ers:
John Holland Earle of Huntingdon, [who] was by King [Henry VI] created
Duke of Exeter ... and William De la Poole Duke of Suffolk, and others, in-
tended to have brought in the Civill Lawes. For a beginning whereof, the
Duke of Exeter being Constable of the Tower first brought into the Tower the
Rack or Brake allowed in many cases by the Civill Law; and thereupon the
Rack is called the Duke of Exeters Daughter, because he first brought it
thither.216
Moreover, Coke argued that the common law was the only effective source
of resistance to the cruel new practices of the civil law:
[U]pon this occasion [the installation of the rack in the Tower of London], Sir
John Fortescue Chiefe Justice of England, wrote his Book in commendation of
the lawes of England; and therein preferreth the same for the government of
this countrey before the Civill Law; and particularly that all tortures and tor-
ments of parties accused were directly against the Common Lawes of Eng-
land.217
In this example, we see most starkly the contrast Coke drew between the
"reason" embodied in the common law and the injustice and cruelty associ-
ated with efforts to institute unusual or innovative practices, particularly
those associated with the civil law. For the crown, the introduction of in-
struments of torture was a necessary first step toward adopting the entire
machinery of the civil law for prosecuting criminal cases, thus freeing itself
from many of the constraints of the common law. For example, the Court
of High Commission, which was England's highest ecclesiastical court, in-
stituted civil law practices such as trial by torture 218 According to Coke,
the inherent reasonableness of the common law-guaranteed by long us-
215 See CLINTON, supra note 210, at 92; FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, SELECTED HISTORICAL
ESSAYS OF F.W. MAITLAND 127 (Helen M. Cam ed., 1957).
216 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, ch. 2, at 1025.
217 Id.
218 See Granucci, supra note 31, at 848-49.
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age-was the only thing that could stand in the way of cruel innovations
imposed by sovereign will, such as the civil law practice of torture.
2. The Common Law as Fundamental Law.-Coke lived in an age of
claims to total state power. The Tudors had vastly increased the power of
the monarch over the preceding century, and when James I took the throne
in 1603, he explicitly claimed the power of absolute monarchy. 19 Coke
never openly disputed this claim, and indeed, he agreed that the king did
possess a sort of absolute power, at least when sitting as head of the body
politic represented by Parliament:
In this Court of Parliament the King is Caput, principium & finis. And as in
the naturall body when all the sinews being joyned in the head do join their
forces together for the strengthning of the body, there is ultimum Potentiae: so
in the politique body when the King and the Lords Spirituall and Temporall,
Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, are all by the Kings command assembled
and joyned together under the head in consultation for the common good of the
whole Realm, there is ultimum Sapientiae.220
When king and Parliament operated within the framework defined by the
common law, with head and body working together for the common good,
Coke saw it as possessing the very same qualities of reasonableness he at-
tributed to the common law itself. Indeed, Coke waxed poetic on the power
of Parliament, affirming that "the power and jurisdiction of the Parliament
for making of laws... is so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be con-
fined either for causes or persons within any bounds." '' Coke also ac-
knowledged that Parliament possessed the power to change common law
rules: "The Common Law hath no controller in any part of it, but the high
Court of Parliament, and if it be not abrogated or altered by Parliament, it
rem aines still. '2
22
Nonetheless, because Coke identified long usage so closely with fun-
damental principles of justice, the common law took on a kind of dual
status in his writings, as a source of both positive law (which could pre-
sumably be altered by Parliament) and of fundamental law (which could
not, or at least should not, be altered). Indeed, Coke argued that abrogating
the common law-in its aspect as fundamental law-would threaten to de-
stroy the kingdom itself: "So dangerous a thing it is, to make or alter any of
the rules or fundamentall points of the Common law, which in truth are the
maine pillars, and supporters of the fabrick of the Common-wealth. 223
219 See KING JAMES I, supra note 206, at 9-10.
220 4 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, ch. 1, at 1067.
221 Id. at 1133.
222 1 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, § 170, at 711.
223 2 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, ch. 35, at 907; see also 4 EDWARD COKE, Preface to
REPORTS (1602) [hereinafter COKE, Preface], as reprinted in I COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note
169, at 94, 95 ("For any fundamental point of the ancient Common Lawes and customes of the realme, it
is a Maxime in policie, and a triall by experience, that the alteration of any of them is most dangerous;
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The common law's status as a source of fundamental law gave it the
potential to limit the arbitrary exercise of state power. Indeed, Coke as-
serted that the common law-as reflected in Magna Carta and elsewhere-
was the source of numerous rights and liberties of citizens, including the
right to due process of law,224 indictment by grand jury,225 habeas corpus,226
the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy,227 and the right to taxation
only with the consent of Parliament.22 Although Coke found the basis for
many of these rights in Magna Carta and other ancient statutes,229 he made
clear that these written laws merely affirmed the existence of rights that had
already developed through long usage. He described Magna Carta as "but a
confirmation or restitution of the Common Law."2 Elsewhere, he wrote
that "[t]he Common Law appeareth in the Statute of Magna Charta and
other ancient Statutes (which for the most part are affirmations of the
Common Law) in the originall writs, in judiciall Records, and in our bookes
of termes and yeers."23" '
3. The Common Law and Unreasonable Statutes.-Because the
common law was the primary source of fundamental law in England, Coke
repeatedly asserted that Parliament lacked the authority to enact laws con-
trary to its most basic principles.232 Coke's most famous assertion of this
claim came as dicta in Dr. Bonham's Case,233 which involved a dispute over
the powers of London's College of Physicians. Henry VIII had granted let-
ters patent to the College-subsequently ratified by Parliament-giving the
College power to license and regulate physicians who practiced medicine in
London.' Dr. Bonham was a physician who received his training and de-
gree from Cambridge University and who insisted that his status as a Cam-
for that which hath beene refined and perfected by all the wisest men in former succession of ages and
proved and approved by continuall experience to be good & profitable for the commonwealth, cannot
without great hazard and danger be altered or chaunged.").
224 2 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, ch. 29, at 858.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 862-64.
227 See 8 EDWARD COKE, Dr. Bonham's Case, in REPORTS (1610) [hereinafter COKE, Dr. Bonham's
Case], as reprinted in I COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 169, at 264, 277 (articulating the right
not to be subjected to double jeopardy: "Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto").
228 See infra Part III.B.4.
229 See, e.g., I COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, § 108, at 697 ("Here it is called Magna Charta,
not for the length or largenesse of it ... but it is called the great Charter in respect of the great weighti-
nesse and weightie greatnesse of the matter contained in it in few words, being the fountaine of all the
fundamentall lawes of the Realme.").
230 Id.
231 1 COKE, FIRST INSTITUTES, supra note 172, § 170, at 711.
232 See id. § 108, at 697 ("If any Statute bee made against either of these Charters [Magna Charta
and the Charta de Forests] it shall be voyd."); 2 id ch. 26, at 843 ("[I]t was it enacted, as often hath been
said, that all Statutes made against Magna Chara... should be voyd.").
233 COKE, Dr. Bonham's Case, supra note 227, at 264.
234 Id. at 265-267.
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bridge graduate exempted him from the licensing authority of the Col-
lege. 35 When Bonham refused to stop practicing medicine in London, the
College fined Bonham and also briefly imprisoned him. 236 Bonham then
sued for false imprisonment. 37
Coke, who was then Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, re-
solved the case in Bonham's favor, holding that the College's corporate
charter did not authorize it to imprison Bonham 3.2 8 Having resolved the
case on relatively narrow grounds, however, Coke went on to make a much
broader statement about the limitations of parliamentary power. Specifi-
cally, Coke noted that if the College of Physicians actually had the power to
fine and imprison unlicensed physicians, it would effectively be the judge
in its own case because the College would first make a finding of liability
and levy a fine-a judicial role-and then keep the resulting fine for itself.
Such an arrangement would violate the longstanding common law rule that
judges should not have a financial interest in the outcomes of the cases they
decide.239 Thus, such an arrangement would be illegal even if directly au-
thorized by an act of Parliament: "[I]n many Cases, the Common Law doth
controll Acts of Parliament, and somtimes shall adjudge them to be void:
for when an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or re-
pugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controll it,
and adjudge such Act to be void. 240
Dr. Bonham's Case is often taken to be a forerunner of the modem
practice of judicial review.24" ' In one sense this is true and in another it is
not. Coke could not have meant to assert that the common law courts had
the power to overturn acts of Parliament. As noted previously, Coke ex-
plicitly asserted that Parliament had supreme authority in England. Indeed,
Parliament was not only a legislature but also the highest court in England,
with power to correct the common law courts and all other lower courts in
England.242 This power flowed downhill, not up.
On the other hand, Coke does seem to have meant that it was possible
for an act of Parliament to violate the fundamental principles of justice em-
bodied in the common law through long usage. In asserting that such acts
235 Id. at 269-270.
236 Id. at 268-269.
237 Id. at 265.
238 Id. at 273.
239 Id. at 275.
240 Id. Coke's notion that statutes contrary to reason were void continued to have vitality through-
out the seventeenth century. See infra Part III.B.5. This notion would also play a major role in the
American Revolution. See infra Part III.D.
241 See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REv. 102, 104
(1910); Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 30,31 (1926).
242 See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY:
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were "void," Coke seems to be making a point similar to Thomas Aquinas's
distinction between "law" and "violence." If a statute fails to comport with
common right and reason, as reflected in the longstanding traditions embod-
ied in the common law, then it is an act of mere power rather than law, and
at least in this sense it is void.
Coke does not say what the remedy should be if Parliament enacts a
statute that violates fundamental common law principles: An effort to re-
peal the law? Refusal to enforce the law? Armed revolution? As is dis-
cussed below, this remedy would be found, in America, with the adoption
of the Bill of Rights and the institution of judicial review. 43
4. The Common Law and Royal Prerogative.-Coke also repeatedly
upheld the long usage of the common law against the absolutist Stuart
kings. At first Coke did so cautiously, but he became much more strident
by the end of his career. As noted above, Coke never directly denied the
claims of James I to absolute monarchy. But in the preface to his fourth
volume of Reports, Coke pointedly translated the following passage from a
thirteenth-century legal treatise by the English judge Henry Bracton: "The
King is under no man, but onely God and the Law, for the Law makes the
King: Therefore let the king attribute that to the Law, which from the law
he hath received, to wit, power and dominion: for where will, and not law
doth sway there is no King."2" Just as Coke had warned that Parliament
could endanger the "fabrick of the Commonwealth" by altering fundamen-
tal common law rules, here Coke warned that the king endangers the very
fact of kingship if he fails to subject himself to the laws and customs of the
English people.
Once again, Coke's writings do not suggest a remedy for royal
breaches of the rule of law. Coke was personally involved, however, in one
major parliamentary attempt to resolve such a breach, when he took a lead-
ing role in the passage of the Petition of Right. 45 In 1628, Charles I con-
vened Parliament to raise funds for a war effort. But before voting on
whether to authorize such funds, Parliament focused on the fact that Charles
had repeatedly violated the common law rights of English subjects. Parlia-
ment asserted that he abused the royal prerogative in a number of ways: im-
prisoning subjects without legal cause, imposing forced loans without the
consent of Parliament, using martial law against English subjects in ordi-
nary criminal cases, and billeting soldiers in the homes of English subjects.
Under Coke's leadership, Parliament drafted the Petition of Right, which
declared these actions to violate the common law rights and liberties of
243 See infra Part II1.E.
244 COKE, Preface, supra note 223, at 102.
245 See generally 3 COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 169, at 1225-1303; CORWIN, supra note
193, at 53.
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Englishmen, as declared in Magna Carta and other ancient statutes. 246 The
Petition asked Charles to direct his officers and ministers to stop the prac-
tices and further asked that he not use these practices in the future as prece-
dent to justify similar actions.247 When the House of Lords sought to protect
the king's ability to exercise the royal prerogative by adding a clause "sav-
ing the sovereign power" to the Petition, Coke famously opposed the
amendment, saying:
I know that prerogative is part of the law, but "Sovereign Power" is no parlia-
mentary word. In my opinion it weakens Magna Charta, and all the statutes;
for they are absolute, without any saving of "Sovereign Power"; and should we
now add it, we shall weaken the foundation of law, and then the building must
needs fall. Take we heed what we yield unto: Magna Charta is such a fellow,
that he will have no "Sovereign." I wonder this "Sovereign" was not in Magna
Charta, or in the confirmations of it. If we grant this, by implication we give a
"Sovereign Power" above all laws. 8
Ultimately, the Petition of Right was sent to Charles without change, and he
assented to it because this was the only way he could convince Parliament
to provide the war funding he needed.249 Although he and subsequent kings
sometimes ignored the Petition of Right, it served as the first major public
document of the modem era setting forth some of the common law rights
protected under the English Constitution.25 The Petition of Right would
later serve as a model for the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence of 1776.
5. Coke's Principles in Practice: "Long Usage" and the Develop-
ment of the English Constitution.-Approximately a century and a half
passed between the English Parliament's adoption of the Petition of Right
in 1628 and the Continental Congress's issuance of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence in 1776. This time period was one of great political upheaval. It
began with the absolutist Stuart kings, whose claims of power to suspend
laws by royal prerogative were among the major causes of the English Civil
War.25 ' The Stuarts were followed by the Long Parliament, which claimed
absolute power for itself by abolishing the monarchy and the House of
Lords.252 After the Restoration, the Long Parliament was followed by a
246 See EDWARD COKE, PETITION OF RIGHT (1628), as reprinted in 3 COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS,
supra note 169, at 1225, 1288-91.
247 Id. at 1290-91.
248 Id. at 1285.
249 Id. at 1295.
250 See, e.g., TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 115, at 430 (calling the Petition of Right "the sec-
ond great fundamental compact between the Crown and the Narion," the first such compact being
Magna Carta).
251 See generally id. at 385-476 (describing the power struggles between king and Parliament that
led to the English Civil War).
252 See id. at 477-81.
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somewhat milder form of Stuart absolutism, including a renewed claim of
royal power to suspend laws. 53 Finally, after the Glorious Revolution, Eng-
land ultimately returned to a system of parliamentary supremacy, albeit
milder than it had seen under Cromwell.254 Parliament's claim to suprem-
acy led directly to the American Revolution.255
Throughout this period of conflict, two views of the nature of govern-
ment power vied with each other for dominance. The first view held that
some institution, whether it be the monarch or the Parliament, must hold
absolute, arbitrary sovereign power, and therefore must itself be above the
law. Writers as diverse as King James I,256 Thomas Hobbes,257 John Mil-
ton,25 Lord Halifax,259 and William Blackstone26° held this view. The sec-
ond view followed Coke in holding that sovereign power was limited by the
rule of law, specifically the fundamental rules of the common law embodied
by long usage.261
253 See id. at 498-99.
254 See generally id. at 565-87.
255 See infra Part III.D.
256 KING JAMES I, supra note 206, at 9-10 ("Kings [are] the authors and makers of the laws and not
the laws of the Kings. . . . [T]he King is above the law as both the author and giver of strength
thereto.").
257 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. XVIII (C.B Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651) (arguing that the
sovereign possesses "the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what
Goods he may enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Sub-
jects"). By virtue of his role as sovereign, "whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Sub-
jects .... It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit iniquity; but not Injustice, or
Injury in the proper signification." Id.
258 John Milton, Brief Notes Upon on a Late Sermon, Titl'd The Fear of God and the King, at 11
(London, Mathew Griffith, D.D. 1660) ("The parliament is above all positive law ... whether civil or
common, makes or unmakes them both.").
259 See GEORGE SAVILE, POLITICAL THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS (1750), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF GEORGE SAVILE, FIRST MARQUESS OF HALIFAX 214 (Walter Raleigh ed., 1912)
("If the Common Law is Supream, then those are so who judge what is the Common Law; and if none
but the Parliament can judge so, there is an end of the Controversy; there is no Fundamental; for the Par-
liament may judge as they please, that is, they have the Authority, but they may judge against Right,
their Power is good, though their Act is ill; no good man will outwardly resist the one, or inwardly ap-
prove the other. There is, then, no other Fundamental, but that every Supream Power must be Arbi-
trary.").
260 See infra Part III.C.3.
261 For example, Charles Herle wrote in 1642 that laws such as Magna Carta, which were declara-
tory of preexisting common law principles, could not be repealed by Parliament: "[A] foundation must
not be stirred while the building stands .... Magna Charta, where most of these fundamentals are (at
least) implied, was law before 'twas written, and but there collected for easier conservation and use."
J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 88 & n.4 (1955) (quoting
CHARLES HERLE, A FULLER ANSWER TO A TREATISE WRITTEN BY DR. FERNE 3, 8 (1642)). Similarly,
in 1679 John Whitehall published a pamphlet entitled Leviathan Found Out, in which he attacked Hob-
bes's argument that sovereign will is the basis for all law. By making this argument, Whitehall asserted,
"Mr. Hobbes principally aimed at the supplanting of our Common Law." If the basis for the law's au-
thority is not the "length of time" a custom is used, but rather the current will of the sovereign, then
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Throughout this period, conflicts between these two views of govern-
ment tended to arise when the holder of sovereign power (whether it be the
monarch or the Parliament) tried to innovate in one of three ways: by
changing the longstanding structure of the government itself, by raising
revenue from English citizens without proper authorization, or by trying
and punishing English citizens in a manner contrary to the common law. In
each case, the innovation was protested on the ground that it was contrary
to long usage, and therefore contrary to reason and destructive of the fabric
of society. For example:
* As noted above, in 1628, Parliament issued the Petition of Right, 6 '
which declared that King Charles I lacked the power to impose taxes
without the consent of Parliament or to imprison subjects without
cause, because such actions violated rights declared in Magna Carta
and established through long usage.263
" After the Long Parliament voted in 1641 to make itself perpetual, both
royalists and radical democrats condemned the action because it was
contrary to long usage. Royalist judge David Jenkins quoted Coke in
arguing that this act was "against common right or reason" and thus
"the common law shall control it, and adjudge this act to be void." 64
Similarly, John Lilburne, the most influential of the Levellers, wrote
that Parliament's decision to make itself perpetual was legally "void"
because it was contrary to "common right or reason." '265
" When Parliament moved toward abolishing the monarchy in the 1640s,
David Jenkins argued that Parliament lacked this power, because mon-
archy had existed since before there were written records and "usage
so practiced makes therein a fundamental law." '266
" In 1647, when the parliamentary army tried a mutinous soldier under
martial law and without common law protections, the Levellers pro-
tested that "neither [by] Act nor by Ordinance can [Parliament] justly
or warrantably destroy the fundamental liberties and principles of the
"down goes the Common Law, . . . and then let the strongest take all." Id. at 235 (quoting JOHN
WHITEHALL, LEVIATHAN FOUND OUT 53 (1679)).
262 See supra Part II1.B.4.
263 See COKE, supra note 246, at 1288-89 ("Your subjects have inherited this freedom, that they
should not be compelled to contribute to any tax, tallage, aid, or other like charge not set by common
consent in parliament .... And ... also, by the statute called, 'The Great Charter of the Liberties of
England,' it is declared and enacted, that no freeman may be taken or imprisoned ... but by the lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.").
264 GOUGH, supra note 261, at 104 (quoting DAVID JENKINS, DISCOURSE TOUCHING THE
INCONVENIENCES OF A LONG-CONTINUED PARLIAMENT 123 (1647)).
265 Id. at I I I n.2 (quoting JOHN LILBURNE, LEGAL FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE OF
ENGLAND 55 (2d ed. 1649)). Indeed, Lilburne's view of the common law derived directly from Coke:
"The Fundamental Law of the Land is the perfection of reason, consisting of lawful and reasonable cus-
toms, received and approved by the people." Id. at 110 (quoting JOHN LILBURNE, LONDON'S LIBERTY
IN CHAINS DISCOVERED (1646)).
266 Id. at 103-04 (quoting DAVID JENKINS, LEX TERRAE; OR LAWS OF THE LAND (1647)).
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common law of England, it being a maxim in law and reason both, that
all such Acts and Ordinances are ipso facto null and void in law, and
bind not at all, but ought to be resisted and stood against to the
death."267
" In 1659, during the debate over restoring the House of Lords, Nathan-
iel Bacon argued that the Lords should not have been abolished, for it
had a right to exist "from long continuance. It hath been so for many
hundred years. Long usage hath so settled it, as Acts of Parliament
cannot alter it. No Act of Parliament can take it away.26
" In 1679, opponents of the Exclusion Bill, which would have excluded
all Catholics-including James, the brother and heir of Charles II-
from taking the throne, argued that the customary rules of succession
were part of the fundamental common law of England and that there-
fore Parliament lacked the power to change them: "[I]t was a great
maxim among our lawyers, that even an act of parliament against
Magna Charta was null of itself.
2 69
" In 1689, Parliament enacted the Bill of Rights,27 ° which declared that
the king's prerogative did not extend to the suspension of laws, crea-
tion of new prerogative courts, levying of taxes without the consent of
Parliament, keeping of a standing army in time of peace, billeting of
soldiers in the homes of subjects, interference with Parliament, and
imposition of "excessive bail," "excessive fines," and "cruel and un-
usual punishments." The Bill of Rights asserted that any attempt to
extend his prerogative to these matters violated "the true, ancient and
indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom." '27 1
" In 1701, the House of Commons ordered the summary imprisonment
of citizens who had petitioned Parliament on a question of war fund-
ing. As a result Daniel Defoe lambasted the Commons for violating
the longstanding common law right to petition Parliament and the right
to be free from imprisonment contrary to the law of the land: "[The
Commons] have no legal power to suspend or dispense with the laws
of the land, any more than the king has by his prerogative ... [and] the
House of Commons has no legal power to imprison anyone." '272
267 Id. at 114-15 (quoting a "manifesto" dated December 14, 1647, titled England's Freedom,
Souldiers'Rights).
268 3 DIARY OF THOMAS BURTON, ESQ. 357 (John Towill Rutt, ed., London, Henry Colbum 1828).
269 GOUGH, supra note 261, at 148 (quoting GILBERT BURNET, HISTORY OF HIS OWN TIME (Ox-
ford, 1823 ed.)). One of the most prominent expositors of this view was Sir Leoline Jenkins, who ar-
gued in parliamentary debates that the exclusion bill was contrary to "the Law of the Land," and that "if
such an Act should pass, it would be invalid in itself." I THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE PRESENT TIME 404 (London, Richard Chandler
1742).
270 See An Act Declareing, supra note 52, at 143.
271 Id.
272 GOUGH, supra note 261, at 175 (quoting DANIEL DEFOE, LEGION'S MEMORIAL 4 (1701)).
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* In 1716, after Parliament passed the Septennial Act, in which it ex-
tended its own tenure from three to seven years, the dissenting Lords
argued that this action violated fundamental rights evidenced by long
custom and usage: "[F]requent and new Parliaments are required by
the fundamental Constitution of the Kingdom; and the practice thereof
for many Ages ... is a sufficient Evidence and Proof of this Constitu-
tion. 273
Similarly, during this time period, a number of prominent English
judges affirmed Coke's assertion that acts of Parliament that violated fun-
damental common law principles were void. For example, in Day v.
Savadge,274 Chief Justice Hobart of the Court of King's Bench repeated
Coke's assertion that "even an Act of Parliament, made against Natural Eq-
uity... is void in it self.2 75 Similarly, in Thomas v. Sorrell,276 Chief Justice
John Vaughan of the Court of Common Pleas asserted that both the king
and Parliament lacked the power to legalize actions that were malum in se,
like "murder, stealing, perjury, trespass." '277 Any law that sought to legalize
such actions "would be a void law in itself," for "the same thing, at the
same time, would be both lawful and unlawful." '78 In City of London v.
Wood,2 79 Chief Justice John Holt of the Court of King's Bench held that a
lawsuit brought by the Mayor of London in the mayor's court to collect a
fine from the defendant should be dismissed on the ground that the mayor
would be-at least nominally-both judge and party in the case:
And what my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case ... is far from any ex-
travagancy, for it is a very reasonable and true saying, That if an act of parlia-
ment should ordain that the same person should be party and judge, or which is
the same thing, judge in his own cause, it would be a void act of parliament;
for it is impossible that one should be judge and party.2"'
As these examples indicate, by the eighteenth century, Coke's ideas
regarding the inherent reasonableness of the common law had achieved a
great deal of acceptance throughout English legal and political culture.
Coke's reasoning served as the primary basis for the notion that government
273 20 H.L. JOUR. 331 (1716), available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=
38557. Similarly, Archibald Hutcheson declared that even if the Septennial Act should "go through all
the forms of an Act of Parliament, pass both Houses, and have the Royal assent ... it will still remain a
dead letter and not obtain the force of a law." He further argued that he was "warranted by one of our
greatest lawyers to affirm 'that an act of parliament may be void of itself."' Mr Hutcheson's Speech
Against Repealing the Triennial Act (1716), in 9 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, at add. 1-32 (n.p., 1742).
274 (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B).
275 Id. at 237.
276 (1673) 124 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P.).
277 Id. at 1102.
278 Id.
279 (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (K.B.).
280 Id. at 1602.
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power was limited by an unwritten constitution whose principles were em-
bodied by long usage. Nonetheless, it was also true that when there was a
direct conflict between a constitutional principle and an act of a state
power-holder-whether it be Parliament or the king-the power-holder
generally won out, at least in the short term. Thus there was a growing
sense of divergence between the normative power of the common law and
the actual power of government.
As the following section reveals, this divergence was spelled out quite
explicitly by Blackstone, particularly in his discussion of Parliament's
abuse of its power to define punishments for crimes. Moreover, the sec-
tions that follow will show that the divergence between common law prin-
ciples and actual parliamentary practice served as a primary motivation for
the American Revolution, and later for the enactment of a written Bill of
Rights that would constrain the power of the federal government within the
normative limits the Bill of Rights prescribed. Many of these normative
limits-including the proscription against cruel and unusual punishments-
were based directly on the long usage of the common law.
C. William Blackstone and the Divergence Between Normative
and Actual Power
If Coke was the most important seventeenth-century expositor of the
common law, William Blackstone filled that role in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, particularly in America. His Commentaries on the Laws of
England have been called the "handbook of the American revolutionary, 281
and "the bible of American jurisprudence in the 19th century. 282 More
specifically, Blackstone's description of common law rights and liberties
was one of the key resources upon which Americans relied in formulating
their reasons for seeking independence from England. 283 But American atti-
tudes toward Blackstone were not uniformly positive. Thomas Jefferson,
for example, praised Coke by saying that "a sounder Whig never wrote,"
but condemned Blackstone as a source of "honeyed Mansfieldism" who led
young lawyers to "forget what whiggism or republicanism means. '"284
Blackstone's dual status as friend and foe of the American Revolution
arose from the fact that the Commentaries upheld and celebrated the norma-
tive power of the common law, while simultaneously affirming the supreme
281 RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 11.
282 CLINTON, supra note 210, at 92.
283 FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 37 n.35 (1985).
284 JEFFERSON, supra note 193, at 376; see also CORWIN, supra note 193, at 86 ("[B]y phraseology
drawn from Locke and Coke themselves, [Blackstone] paves the way to the entirely opposed position of
Hobbes and Mansfield."); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
299 n.66 (1972).
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actual power of Parliament. 285  Blackstone exalted Coke's vision of the
common law, waxing poetic on the inherent reasonableness and compatibil-
ity with liberty that were assured by "long usage. '"2 86 At the same time,
however, Blackstone asserted that Parliament possessed supreme sovereign
power and that in the event of a conflict between a fundamental common
law principle and an act of Parliament, the common law must yield.287
Blackstone saw that his position-which reflected the orthodox English le-
gal thought of the time-created the potential for Parliament to enact unrea-
sonable and oppressive laws. Indeed, Blackstone harshly criticized
Parliament for deviating from the reason of the common law in the area of
criminal punishment. 288 Nonetheless, because he affirmed that Parliament
possessed absolute power, he denied that Parliament's unreasonable innova-
tions could be considered void.
289
1. The Normative Force of the Common Law.-In his introduction to
the Commentaries, Blackstone followed Coke in equating the common law
with customary law. He wrote that "the first ground and chief corner stone
of the laws of England" was "general immemorial custom, or common law,
from time to time declared in the decisions of the courts of justice.""29 Of
course, not all customs were part of the common law. Rather, the only cus-
toms that had "binding power, and the force of laws" were those that en-
joyed "long and immemorial usage" and "universal reception throughout
the kingdom."29' Customs that were relatively new-that had not "been
used time out of mind" 92 -were not part of the common law.
According to Blackstone, the requirement of long usage gave the
common law two primary advantages over positive law. First, Blackstone
asserted that customary laws supported by long usage possessed "internal
evidence of freedom," for they arose through "the voluntary consent of the
people ' 293 rather than through the imposition of sovereign will. Thus, the
common law was more reliably consistent with "English liberty '294 than
positive law. Second, Blackstone followed Coke in affirming that common
285 For a nuanced description of Blackstone's influence in America during and after the revolution-
ary period, see Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1,4-19 (1996).
286 See infra Part III.C.I.
287 See infra Part III.C.3.
288 See infra Part 11I.C.4.
289 See infra Part III.C.4.
290 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *73.
291 Id. at *64.
292 Id. at *67.
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law supported by long usage must accord with the basic principles of reason
and justice embodied in the natural law.295
In other words, Blackstone shared Coke's conviction that the customs
of the English people were inherently reasonable and that if a given cus-
tomary law enjoyed long usage and universal reception, it comported with
the fundamental principles of the natural law. Blackstone also followed
Coke in declaring that the common law was the source of the fundamental
rights of English citizens. Blackstone included among these the right to
trial by jury in the vicinage of the offense,296 habeas corpus,2 97 the right not
to be subjected to double jeopardy,298 and the right not to be taxed without
the consent of the people's representatives in Parliament.299 And of course,
Blackstone also found in the common law the right to be free from "cruel
and unusual punishments."300
2. The Common Law and Innovation.-Blackstone also shared
Coke's distrust of legal innovation that deviated from the common law, al-
though he generally stated his distrust more mildly. Whereas Coke ex-
travagantly claimed that the common law could always be relied upon to
"utterly crush" the "drosse and sophistications of novelties and new inven-
tions,"3 °1 Blackstone merely stated that when new statutes changed an an-
cient common law rule whose purpose has been forgotten, the usual result
was that "the wisdom of the rule hath in the end appeared from the incon-
veniences that have followed the innovation."3 2
Blackstone shared Coke's vehemence, however, with respect to the
"innovations" arising from attempts to introduce the continental civil law
system into England. Blackstone described the civil law as an enslaving
force that established a "new Roman empire" over continental Europe and
caused the people of Europe to lose their "political liberties.""3 3 According
to Blackstone, a cabal of foreigners and "popish clergy" conspired to bring
the civil law to England and used it to make "repeated attacks" on the
common law.3 4 In attacking the common law, the supporters of the civil
law were actually attacking the rights and liberties of English citizens. For
example, Blackstone repeated Coke's assertion that those who sought to in-
295 Id. at *70 ("[O]ur lawyers are with justice so copious in their encomiums on the reason of the
common law; ... the law is the perfection of reason, . it always intends to conform thereto, and ...
what is not reason is not law.").
296 3 id. at *349-50.
297 Id. at * 129.
298 4 id. at *335.
299 1 id. at *169.
300 4 id. at *379.
301 1 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 172, § 723, at 740.
302 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *70.
303 Id. at *67.
304 Id.
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troduce the civil law system started by bringing the Rack into the Tower of
London.0 5 It was only because the common law had "vigorously with-
stood" such attacks by proponents of the civil law that the liberties of the
English people had been preserved. °6
3. The Common Law and Parliamentary Power.-If Blackstone was
aligned with Coke by his devotion to the "reason" of the common law-not
to mention his hostility to the innovations of the civil law-he was sepa-
rated from him by his belief in the supremacy of parliamentary power. As
described above, Coke's idea of parliamentary supremacy depended upon
the organic unity he saw between the "reason" of the common law and the
"wisdom" of Parliament.3 7 Coming after a hundred years of civil wars,
executions, restorations, abdications, and "glorious" revolutions, Black-
stone did not share Coke's vision of the organic unity of king, Parliament,
and common law. Rather, Blackstone saw a need to identify a particular
organ of government as the locus of supreme power to which the others
must bend. He found that locus of power in Parliament. Thus, he stated
that "the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always ... of ab-
solute authority.""3 Later, he made this claim even more strongly:
[Parliament] hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirm-
ing, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of
laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or tem-
poral, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that ab-
solute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is
entrusted by the constitution.30 9
Like James I, Milton, Halifax, and Hobbes, Blackstone asserted that, as a
matter of logic, the sovereign must possess uncontrolled, absolute, and arbi-
trary power."' Sovereign power could not be constrained by law because
the sovereign is both the source and the ultimate interpreter of law. Noth-
ing outside the sovereign can constrain the sovereign, and therefore who-
ever possesses sovereignty-in this case, Parliament-has absolute despotic
power.
Because Parliament possessed supreme sovereign power, Blackstone
took the position that Parliament could not be constrained even by the
common law: "Where the common law and a statute differ, the common
law gives place to the statute." '' In making this assertion, Blackstone was
305 4 id. at *325-26.
306 1 id. at *67.
307 See supra Part III.B.2.
308 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *90.
309 id. at * 160. Of course, later in the Commentaries, Blackstone contradicts his own claim that
every state needs a source of absolute, despotic power, saying instead that "the true liberty of the subject
consists not so much in the gracious behaviour, as in the limited power, of the sovereign." 4 id at *426.
310 See supra Part III.B.5.
311 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *89.
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not merely referring to specific common law rules, which everyone agreed
Parliament could change, but also to fundamental common law principles
such as those articulated in Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the Bill
of Rights. For example, as noted above, Coke asserted in Dr. Bonham's
Case that Parliament lacked power to violate the common law by making a
party judge in its own case.312 This assertion received sufficient acceptance
that two subsequent Chief Justices, Holt and Vaughan, repeated it in their
opinions as a settled matter of law.313 But when Blackstone came to this as-
sertion, he wrote the following:
[I]f we could conceive it possible for the Parliament to enact that [a judge]
should try as well his own causes as those of other persons, there is no court
that has the power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such
evident and express words as to leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the
legislature or no.
314
In Blackstone's view nothing, not even fundamental and long-established
principles of justice, could constrain Parliament's power to exercise its own
will. As discussed below, the American colonists who revolted against
England a little over a decade after the Commentaries was published vehe-
mently disagreed with Blackstone regarding this point. Indeed, both the
American Revolution and the adoption of the Bill of Rights were motivated
by the desire to ensure that government would be restrained by fundamental
principles of justice such as those embodied in the common law.
4. Criminal Punishment and the Misuse of Parliamentary Power.-
Although Blackstone believed in the supreme power of Parliament, he did
not believe in the supreme wisdom Of all of its acts. As discussed above,
Blackstone made a distinction between the normative power of the common
law and the actual power of Parliament. In other words, he followed Coke
in believing that the common law embodied fundamental principles of jus-
tice, but did not believe that acts of Parliament, whose authority was based
on the will of the sovereign rather than custom and long usage, possessed
the same qualities. Although Parliament was free to ignore the principles of
the common law and enact whatever law it pleased, the results of such in-
novations were usually at least "inconvenient," '315 and often unjust.316
Nowhere is Blackstone's distinction between normative and actual
power clearer than in his discussion of the English criminal justice system.
Blackstone praised the English system of criminal prosecution-in com-
parison to the systems prevalent in continental Europe-because of the
common law protections that were afforded to criminal defendants. In Eng-
312 See supra Part III.B.3.
313 See supra Part III.B.5.
314 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *91.
315 Id. at *70.
316 See infra Part III.D.
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land, "crimes are more accurately defined, and penalties less uncertain and
arbitrary; ... all our accusations are public, and our trials in the face of the
world;... torture is unknown, and every delinquent is judged by such of his
equals, against whom he can form no exception, nor even a personal dis-
like." '317
Blackstone also generally praised the English system of criminal pun-
ishment, which was much fairer and more merciful than "the shocking ap-
paratus of death and torment" that prevailed in the countries of continental
Europe.31 The English system of punishment was fairer than that in Europe
because "the nature, though not always the quantity or degree, of punish-
ment is ascertained for every offense; and . . . it is not left in the breast of
any judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment, which the law has be-
forehand ordained, for every subject alike, without respect of persons.'319
Although English judges had discretion in sentencing, "[their] discretion is
regulated by law. For the bill of rights has particularly declared, that exces-
sive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted: (which had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings in the
court of king's bench, in the reign of king James the second).""32 Finally,
although the law permitted horrific punishments for crimes such as treason,
including burning at the stake, drawing and quartering, and disembowel-
ment, "the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a tacit con-
sent, an almost general mitigation of such part of these judgments as savour
of torture or cruelty."32' In other words, according to Blackstone, the cruel-
est forms of punishment traditionally employed in England were falling out
of usage by the middle of the eighteenth century.
Even as Blackstone celebrated the relative fairness and mercifulness of
England's common law system of criminal justice, however, he harshly
criticized the fact that over the course of the eighteenth century, Parliament
had deviated from the common law and transformed over one hundred and
fifty crimes into capital offenses.3 2 Blackstone argued that Parliament had
acted irrationally-and often to benefit "the passions or interests of a
few" 323-by making numerous minor crimes capital offenses, including, for
example, the crimes of "break[ing] down . .. the mound of a fishpond,
whereby any fish shall escape; or ... cut[ting] down a cherry tree in an or-
chard." '324
317 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *3-4.
318 Id. at *377.
319 Id.
320 Id. at *378.
321 Id. at *376.
322 Id. at * 18 ("It is a melancholy truth, that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable
to commit, no less than an hundred and sixty have been declared by act of parliament to be felonies
without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of instant death.").
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Blackstone further condemned Parliament for failing to make any dis-
tinction between greater and lesser offenses in assigning capital punish-
ments, and even implied that Parliament's approach to this issue showed it
to be incompetent and tyrannical:
[S]anguinary laws are a bad symptom of the distemper in any state.... It is
moreover absurd and impolitic to apply the same punishment to crimes of dif-
ferent malignity. A multitude of sanguinary laws (besides the doubt that may
be entertained concerning the right of making them) do likewise prove a mani-
fest defect in the wisdom of the legislative, or the strength of the executive
power. It is a kind of quackery in government, and argues a want of solid
skill, to apply the same universal remedy, the ultimum supplicium, to every
case of difficulty. It is, it must be owned, much easier to extirpate than to
amend mankind: yet that magistrate must be esteemed both a weak and a cruel
surgeon, who cuts off every limb, which through ignorance or indolence he
will not attempt to cure.325
This is a remarkable passage by any measure, particularly when one
considers that it was written by a noted champion of parliamentary suprem-
acy. Blackstone here describes Parliament's actions as "absurd and impoli-
tic," demonstrating a "defect in legislative wisdom," and constituting
"quackery in government" performed by a "weak and cruel surgeon." Ac-
cording to Blackstone, Parliament had departed from the rule of reason rep-
resented by the common law tradition by wantonly expanding the scope of
capital punishment to include major and minor offenses without reference
to customary notions of proportionality and desert, and had thus begun to
exercise power in a tyrannical manner. Blackstone went so far as to imply
that Parliament may have exceeded its legitimate power in enacting these
laws, saying, "I would not be understood to deny the right of the legislature
in any country to inforce it's own laws by the death of the transgressor,
though persons of some abilities have doubted it." '326 In sum, Blackstone
seems to accuse Parliament of having enacted laws that deviated from the
long usage of the common law in a manner directly contrary to basic prin-
ciples of justice. These laws were thus-for lack of a better term-"cruel
and unusual." He stops short of making this last claim, however, because
according to his own view of the English Constitution, the constraints of the
common law did not apply to Parliament.
D. Long Usage and the American Revolution
The American Revolution is perhaps unique among the revolutions of
modem times, in that those who conducted it saw themselves as fighting to
preserve, rather than throw off, the legal traditions of the government
against which they rebelled. As Gordon Wood has written, American devo-
325 Id. at *17.
326 Id. at *1I.
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tion to English legal tradition was "what made their Revolution seem so
unusual, for they revolted not against the English constitution but on behalf
of it. '3 27 John Adams expressed mainstream American opinion when he
wrote that "the liberty, the unalienable, indefeasible rights of men, the
honor and dignity of human nature, the grandeur and glory of the public,
and the universal happiness of individuals, were never so skillfully and suc-
cessfully consulted as in that most excellent monument of human art, the
common law of England.'3 28 As demonstrated below, the American revolu-
tionaries saw themselves as fighting for the rights embodied in this "monu-
ment of human art,"3 29 against an English Parliament that seemed bent on
depriving them of such rights.33
1. The Common Law in the Early American Colonies.-When the
American colonies were first settled in the seventeenth century, the com-
mon law did not have a strong or universal hold within them. Rather, the
legal system in most early American colonies was based on relatively sim-
ple legal codes that were meant to regulate day-to-day life among the colo-
nists.331 As the colonists became more numerous and more prosperous over
the course of the eighteenth century, however, and as the numbers of trained
lawyers increased, the American colonies came to receive the common law
as part of their own system of laws.332 By the end of the eighteenth century,
reception of the common law was so universal that Chief Justice Oliver
Ellsworth could tell a grand jury that the common law "as brought from the
country of our ancestors, with here and there an accommodating exception,
in nature of local customs, was the law of every part of the union at the
formation of the national compact." '333 In all the colonies where the com-
mon law was received, however, it was adapted to meet American circum-
327 WOOD, supra note 284, at 10. The American colonists recognized that the English Constitution
was itself founded upon the common law. For example, Noah Webster wrote that the English Constitu-
tion "consists rather of practice, or of common law, with some statutes of Parliament." Id. at 261 n.4
(quoting Noah Webster, l AM. MAC. 77 (1787-1788)).
328 John Adams, On Private Revenge, BOSTON GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 1763, reprinted in 3 JOHN
ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF
THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 438, 440 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851)
[hereinafter THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS].
329 Id.
330 See generally Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
331 See PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 53
(Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2004) (1898).
332 Id. at 7-8.
333 Oliver Ellsworth 's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of South Caro-
lina, 7 May 1799, in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, at 358 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990); see also REINSCH, supra note 331, at 8-9 ("[D]uring the
decade immediately preceding Independence, the English common law was generally praised and ap-
parently most readily received by the larger part of American courts," although the courts also retained
many of the "marks of the old popular law.").
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stances. As John Adams wrote in 1774: "Our ancestors were entitled to the
common law of England when they emigrated; that is to say, to as much of
it as they pleased to adopt and no more." '334
Even where the common law was not initially received as a source of
positive law, American colonists tended to draw on it as a source of funda-
mental rights and liberties against the state.335 For example, the common
law practice of trial by jury was adopted throughout the colonies early on,"3
even in colonies such as Massachusetts, which claimed to look to the Bible
rather than the common law as the primary source of fundamental law.337
Similarly, seventeenth-century colonists reacted to perceived unfairness in
colonial government by asking for the protections of the common law.33 In
seventeenth-century Massachusetts, the requests for implementation of the
common law were so strong that the Puritan government issued a point-by-
point comparison of Massachusetts law and Magna Carta, designed to show
that colonial government provided essentially the same rights and protec-
tions as the English common law.339 Starting in the seventeenth century and
continuing through the eighteenth century, colonial governments frequently
declared that the colonists possessed the same common law rights as other
English citizens.34
2. Pre-Revolutionary Conflicts.-The period from 1760 to 1776 was
a time of conflict between the American colonies and the British Parlia-
ment. This conflict resembled England's own seventeenth-century constitu-
tional conflicts in at least three ways. First, as in seventeenth-century
England, the holder of state power-in this case, Parliament-claimed ab-
solute power, unconstrained by fundamental common law limits. Second,
American protesters, like their seventeenth-century English counterparts,
argued that Parliament did not hold absolute power because it lacked the au-
thority to abrogate fundamental common law rules embodied by long usage.
334 JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS: OR, A HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA, FROM ITS ORIGIN,
IN 1754, TO THE PRESENT TIME (1819), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 328, at
3, 122. Justice Story expressed the same view fifty years later in Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137
(1829): "The common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ances-
tors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birth-right; but they brought with
them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their condition." Id. at 7.
335 See REINSCH, supra note 331, at 58 ("Most of the colonies made their earliest appeals to the
common law in its character of a muniment of English liberty.").
336 See id. at 55.
337 See id. at 17-18.
338 See id. at 23.
339 See A Declaration of the General Court Holden at Boston 4(9) 1646, Concerning a Remon-
strance and Petition Exhibited at Last Session of this Court by Doctor Child, Thomas Fowle, Samuel
Maverick, Thomas Burton, John Smith, David Yale, and John Dand, in A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL
PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETrS-BAY 196-208 (Thomas Hut-
chinson ed., Boston, Thomas & John Fleet 1769).
340 See REINSCH, supra note 331, at 27, 28, 34, 36, 41,43, 50.
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Indeed, Americans repeatedly condemned Parliament's actions during this
time period as "innovations" and "usurpations" that were "unusual," "un-
constitutional," and "void" because they were contrary to "common right or
reason." Third, many of the same conflicts that had dominated seventeenth-
century constitutional battles reappeared in the eighteenth-century conflict
between England and America: taxation without the consent of one's repre-
sentatives in Parliament, the interference with the functioning of legisla-
tures, the denial of common law protections in criminal trials, and the
replacement of the common law with the civil law.
Like King James I, John Milton, Thomas Hobbes, and numerous other
proponents of absolute sovereignty,34" ' the Parliament of the 1760s and
1770s claimed that the state possessed total power to act and to make new
law, unconstrained by the limits of the common law. Thus, for example,
the Declaratory Act of 1766 stated that Parliament had "full power and au-
thority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the
colonies and people of America. . . in all cases whatsoever. 342
The Americans who opposed Parliament's actions during this period
claimed that Parliament's power was limited by the rights American colo-
nists held as British subjects. These rights, in turn, were based on the long
usage of the common law. For example, Richard Henry Lee argued that
American rights "are built upon a fourfold foundation, namely natural law,
the British constitution, the charters of the several colonies, and 'immemo-
rial usage.' 3 43 Similarly, Roger Sherman asserted that American rights
were based on the common law: "The Colonies adopt the common Law, not
as the common Law, but as the highest Reason."3" Indeed, the 1774 Decla-
ration and Resolves of the Continental Congress stated that American rights
were based on "the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English
constitution, and the several charters or compacts" of the various colonies;
that the colonists retained the "rights, liberties, and immunities of free and
natural born subjects, within the realm of England"; and that these rights in-
cluded the right to "the common law of England, and more especially to the
great and inestimable priviledge of being tried by their peers of the vici-
nage, according to the course of that law. 345
Americans used the Cokean vision of the common law to protest every
act of Parliament that they believed violated their rights. For example,
Americans and their English allies argued that the common law forbade
Parliament from taxing Americans because they were not represented in
341 See supra Part III.B.5.
342 The Declaratory Act, 1766, 6 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Gr. Brit.), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/amerrev/parliament/declaratoryact_ 766.htm.
343 John Adams, Notes of Debates (Sept. 8, 1774), in 1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS,
1774-1789, at 46 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1976).
344 Id. at 47.
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Parliament. Thus, John Dickinson wrote in his Letters from a Farmer in
Pennsylvania that Parliament's claim of power to tax the colonies was "an
innovation; and a most dangerous innovation." '346 Similarly, Lord Camden,
Chief Justice of England, condemned such taxation as "illegal, absolutely
illegal, contrary to the fundamental laws of nature, contrary to the funda-
mental laws of this constitution ... for whatever is a man's own is abso-
lutely his own; no man hath a right to take it from him without his consent,
either expressed by himself or [his] representative." '34 7
Americans also argued that Parliament lacked the authority to subject
them to criminal trial without the protections of the common law. Parlia-
ment threatened this right in two ways. First, under the Stamp Act, Parlia-
ment gave the admiralty court jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions
"relating to the trade or revenues of the said colonies or plantations.""34 Be-
cause the admiralty court employed civil law procedures, Americans saw
the Stamp Act as an attempt to deny them their common law right to trial by
jury.349 Indeed, Americans saw themselves as reenacting the English consti-
tutional struggles of the seventeenth century, in which parliamentarians and
common lawyers opposed royal attempts to exert control through the cruel
practices of civil law courts, such as the Star Chamber and Court of High
Commission. "Can you recollect the complaints and clamors," wrote John
Adams to a supporter of the Stamp Act, "which were sounded with such in-
dustry, and supported by such a profusion of law and history, and such in-
vincible reasoning... against the Star Chamber and High Commission, and
yet remain an advocate for the newly formed courts of admiralty in Amer-
ica?"350
346 John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colo-
nies, in SOURCES & DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788, at 34, 40
(Samuel Eliot Morison ed., 1967).
347 Similarly, in a speech before the House of Lords, Lord Chatham asserted that "[it] has always
been my received and unalterable opinion ... that this country had no right under heaven to tax Amer-
ica." THE DEBATE ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1761-1783, at 151, 155 (Max Beloff ed., 3d ed.
1989).
348 Stamp Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Gr. Brit.), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
amerrev/parliament/stampact_ 1765.htm.
349 See John Adams, Instructions of the Town of Braintree to Their Representative, 1765, BOSTON
GAZETTE, Oct. 14, 1765, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 328, at 465, 466-67.
[T]he most grievous innovation of all, is the alarming extension of the power of courts of admi-
ralty. In these courts, one judge presides alone! No juries have any concern there! . .. [T]he
Stamp Act has opened a vast number of sources of new crimes, which may be committed by any
man ... and prodigious penalties are annexed, and all these are to be tried by such a judge of such
a court!
These instructions were drafted by John Adams and adopted by the town without amendment. See JOHN
ADAMS, Diary, with Sections from an Autobiography, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note
328, at 2, 153.
350 John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOSTON GAZETTE (SUPPLEMENT), Jan. 13,
1766, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 328, at 469,470.
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Parliament threatened Americans' common law rights in a second way
by making several efforts to provide for the removal of rebellious Ameri-
cans to England for trial, a practice that would violate the common law
right to trial by jury in the vicinage of the offense."' When Parliament pro-
posed that the king revive a long-dormant statute that would permit England
to ship American protesters to England to be tried for treason, the Virginia
House of Burgesses issued two separate protests: On May 16, 1769, it re-
solved that Parliament's suggestion was "highly derogatory of the Rights of
British subjects; as thereby the inestimable privilege of being tried by a jury
from the vicinage, as well as the liberty of summoning and producing wit-
nesses on such trial, will be taken away from the party accused." '352 Then,
on May 17, 1769, it sent forth a separate address to the king, calling Parlia-
ment's plan "new, unusual ... unconstitutional and illegal." '353
3. The Declaration of Independence.-Even at the moment the Con-
tinental Congress decided to sever America's ties to England, it relied in
part on common law principles in justifying its decision. Indeed, the Decla-
ration of Independence was self-consciously modeled after two key parlia-
mentary documents setting forth the fundamental common law principles
underlying the English constitution: the Petition of Right of 1628 and the
Bill of Rights of 1689. The most obvious similarity is in the Declaration's
rhetorical stance. Like those seventeenth-century parliamentary documents,
the Declaration is structured primarily as a set of complaints regarding a se-
ries of listed "injuries and usurpations." '354 Moreover, the Declaration de-
scribes most of these "injuries and usurpations" in common law language
already familiar from the Petition of Right and the English Bill of Rights.
For example, the Declaration complains that the Crown has undermined the
common law right of legislative representation by suspending operation of
laws passed by the colonial legislatures, by dissolving colonial legislatures
and refusing to call new ones, and by disrupting the legislative process
through "call[ing] together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfort-
able, and distant from the repository of their public records, for the sole
purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures." '355 The Dec-
laration also lists a variety of other "injuries and usurpations," many of
which were familiar from past conflicts between Parliament and the Stuart
351 For a discussion of the historical development in America of the righl to trial by jury in the vici-
nage of the offense, see Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1658 (2000).
352 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1766-1769, supra note 36, at 214.
353 Id. at 215.
354 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
355 Id. para. 6.
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kings, including taxation without representation,356 quartering of soldiers in
civilian homes,357 denial of the right to trial by jury,358 and so forth.
It is worth noting that the Declaration's complaint about the calling of
legislative bodies in "unusual" places-meaning places different from the
ones designated by long usage-was a common one throughout English
history. It was considered a violation of the common law for the king or
royal officials to arbitrarily vary the location of parliaments, courts, or other
official proceedings in order to discourage attendance. Indeed, as we have
seen above, under the English common law, a sheriff could be indicted for
holding a Torn in an "unusual" location.359 The Continental Congress's use
of the word "unusual" in the Declaration of Independence indicates that at
the moment America formally separated itself from all legal ties to England,
it saw long usage as a relevant source of standards for judging government
actions.
4. Formation of State Governments and State Declarations of
Rights.-After declaring independence from Great Britain, the Continental
Congress directed the colonies to form state governments.36 ° Virginia was
the first to do so, adopting not only a state constitution, but also a Declara-
tion of Rights.36' The purpose of the Declaration of Rights was to ensure
that the state government could not do what England had done and declare
its own power to be supreme, arbitrary, and above even fundamental princi-
ples of justice. To accomplish this result, the Declaration of Rights-
drafted primarily by George Mason362 -listed a set of fundamental rights
that were beyond the power of the legislature to violate. Among these
rights was the right not to be subjected to "cruel and unusual punish-
ments." '363
Other states quickly followed Virginia's lead. By 1784, every state
had adopted a state constitution.3" A majority of these states adopted bills
of rights that contained provisions that more or less echoed Virginia's Dec-
laration of Rights. 65 Twelve states provided, by statute or constitution, for
continuation of the common law.366 By 1790, nine states had constitutional
356 Id. para. 19.
357 Id. para. 16.
358 Id. para. 20.
359 See HAWKINS, supra note 181, at 91.
360 See RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 30.
361 Id. at 39.
362 Id. at 35-36.
363 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. IX (June 12, 1776), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/virginia.htm.
364 RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 41.
365 Id. at 44. The states were Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massa-
chusetts, and New Hampshire.
366 See MCDONALD, supra note 283, at 46; CLINTON, supra note 210, at 91.
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provisions prohibiting "cruel and unusual, 367 "cruel or unusual,""36 or
merely "cruel" punishments.369
The provisions in the various state constitutions and bills of rights for
preserving the common law and prohibiting cruel punishments reflected a
general consensus on two points: First, the government should not impose
cruel punishments. Second, the common law was essentially reasonable, so
that governmental efforts to "ratchet up" punishment beyond what was
permitted by the common law were presumptively contrary to reason.
Given this dual consensus, the words "cruel" and "unusual" acted as syno-
nyms when employed in the context of punishment. The word "cruel"
stated the abstract moral principle, and the word "unusual" provided a con-
crete reference point for determining whether that principle had been vio-
lated. Thus, it makes sense that some states outlawed "cruel punishments,"
some outlawed "cruel and unusual punishments," and some outlawed "cruel
or unusual punishments." Each formulation is simply a different way of
saying the same thing.37°
5. Conclusions Regarding the Common Law and the American Revo-
lution.-As the section above indicates, American colonists rebelled against
England largely because they believed that the English Parliament had de-
nied them basic common law rights. In articulating the basis for their
rights, the American colonists used the terms "immemorial usage," "com-
mon law," "constitution," "reason," and "natural equity" virtually inter-
changeably. 7' Similarly, when complaining about Parliament's violations
of their rights, the colonists used the terms "innovation," "usurpation," "un-
367 "Cruel and unusual" punishments were forbidden by New York and Virginia. See N.Y. BILL OF
RIGHTS (1787), as reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 615 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); VA. CONST. § 9 (1776), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/states/va05.htm. In addition, the Maryland Constitution contained both a prohibition on
"cruel or unusual punishments" as well as the following prohibition on legislative enactments: "[N]o
law, to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties, ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereaf-
ter." MD. CONST. para. XIV (1776), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ma02.htm.
368 "Cruel or unusual" punishments were forbidden by Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, New
Hampshire, and North Carolina. See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776), reprinted in 2 THE
ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 278 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980); MD. CONST. para. XXII (1776),
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ma02.htm; MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
para. XXVI (1780), reprinted in THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 343; N.H. BILL OF
RIGHTS para. XXXIII (1783), reprinted in THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 379; N.C.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. X (1776), reprinted in THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at
287.
369 "Cruel punishments" were forbidden by Pennsylvania and South Carolina. See PA. CONST. art.
IX, § 13 (1790), as reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 367, at 615; S.C. CONST.
art. IX, § 4 (1790), as reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 367, at 616.
370 After reviewing the historical evidence from various states, Tom Stacy has observed that "the
available evidence indicates that the Founders understood [the formulations "cruel and unusual," "cruel
or unusual" and "cruel"] to capture the same meaning." Stacy, supra note 3, at 503.
371 See supra Part II.D.2-4.
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constitutional," and "unusual" virtually interchangeably. 72 Because Ameri-
can rights were based on long usage, parliamentary acts that deviated from
it--"innovative" or "unusual" acts-were presumptively unconstitutional.
Indeed, as John Adams's critique of the Stamp Act indicates, Americans
saw such innovations as a precursor to the introduction of the cruel prac-
tices of the civil law, including trial by torture.373 In enacting state declara-
tions of rights, the various states sought to ensure that state governments
would not emulate Parliament by attempting to extend their power in such a
way as to violate fundamental rights, most of which were defined by the
common law.
E. Long Usage and the Eighth Amendment
1. The Common Law and the Constitution.-In the summer of 1787,
some eleven years after the Declaration of Independence, a group of dele-
gates from the thirteen states who had been sent to Philadelphia to amend
and strengthen the Articles of Confederation decided instead to adopt a new
constitution that would make the federal government stronger.3 74 The new
government was not meant to replace state governments; rather, it was to be
a limited government of enumerated powers whose authority would be su-
preme within its proper sphere but would not exist at all outside of that
sphere.37 Nonetheless, the new Constitution would vastly expand the
power of the federal government, in part by giving it direct power to regu-
late the lives of United States citizens and to prosecute those who violated
federal law.376
From the very moment the Constitution was adopted by the convention
in Philadelphia, it came under withering criticism for failing either to in-
clude a bill of rights or to acknowledge that the new federal government
would be bound by the constraints of the common law. George Mason,
who was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, led the charge in this
regard. In the final week of the convention, Mason first proposed that a bill
of rights be attached.377 When the other delegates-who had struggled over
372 See supra Part IIl.D.2-4.
373 See supra Part 111.D.2.
374 See generally RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 106-25.
375 For example, James Wilson, one of the primary drafters of the United States Constitution, stated
that the Constitution created a government whose "powers are particularly enumerated. In [such a] case,
the implied result is, that nothing more is intended to be given than what is so enumerated, unless it re-
sults from the nature of the government itself." James Wilson, Speech Before the Pennsylvania Conven-
tion for Ratification of the United States Constitution (Nov. 20, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note t, at 454.
376 Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 130 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (com-
plaining that under the Articles of Confederation, "the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle
of a government, destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its
own laws").
377 FARRAND, supra note 187, at 587.
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the Constitution all summer and wanted to go home-refused Mason's pro-
posal, he refused to vote for the Constitution. 378 Furthermore, shortly after
the convention concluded, he published a series of "Objections to this Con-
stitution of Government," which prominently included the complaint that
[t]here is no Declaration of Rights, and the laws of the general government be-
ing paramount to the laws and constitution of the several States, the Declara-
tion of Rights in the separate States are no security. Nor are the people
secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law which stands
here upon no other foundation than its having been adopted by the respective
acts forming the constitutions of the several States.379
Because the Constitution did not include a Declaration of Rights and be-
cause the new federal government would not be bound by the common law,
Mason feared that the federal government would be able to take unlimited
and tyrannical powers unto itself.38° In particular, he worried that under the
Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, Section 8, "Congress may grant
monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual
and severe punishments, and extend their powers as far as they shall think
proper; so that the State legislatures have no security for the powers now
presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights."38'
Mason's claim that the new federal government would not be bound by
the common law was not entirely accurate. The Constitution contained
some traditional common law protections, including, for example, the privi-
lege of habeas corpus,38 2 the right of criminal defendants to trial by jury
within the state where the offense was committed,383 and the invalidity of ex
post facto laws. 4 But these protections were not enough for the Antifeder-
alists who opposed the Constitution.385 The Constitution only preserved the
right to a jury trial in criminal cases, not civil ones. Thus, the Antifederal-
ists feared that it left room for the adoption of the cruel and corrupt prac-
378 Id. at 649. Elbridge Gerry and Edmond Randolph also refused to vote for the Constitution.
379 Id. at 637-40.
380 Mason's concerns about the lack of common law restraints on the new federal government were
echoed by other opponents of the Constitution, who collectively became known as the Antifederalists.
For example, the "Federal Farmer" wrote: "I confess in the constitution of this supreme court, as left by
the constitution, I do not see a spark of freedom or a shadow of our own or the British common law."
Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in LETTERS FROM THE
FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 13, 24 (Walter Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978) [hereinafter
LETERS].
381 FARRAND, supra note 187, at 640.
382 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
383 Id. art. 1ll, § 2, cl.3.
384 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
385 For example, the influential Letters from the Federal Farmer maintained that "[s]ecurity against
ex post facto laws, the trial by jury, and the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, are but a part of those
inestimable rights the people of the United States are entitled to, even in judicial proceedings, by the
course of the common law." Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788),
reprinted in LETTERS, supra note 380, at 105, 109.
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tices of the European civil law system." 6 Moreover, the Antifederalists
were concerned that even the guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases
could be avoided by a future tyrannical government. Because Article III,
Section 2 gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law
and Fact," they argued that some future Court might discard jury acquittals
in criminal cases and conduct its own proceedings according to the tyranni-
cal practices of the civil law.387 The Constitution also failed to provide for a
variety of other common law rights, including the defendant's right to be in-
formed of the charges against him, to confront his accuser, to call witnesses,
to have assistance of counsel, and to be free from cruel and unusual pun-
ishments, and thus the Antifederalists believed it left too much room for fu-
ture federal tyranny.388
In the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Abraham Holmes provided
perhaps the most colorful vision of the tyranny that the Constitution's gaps
in common law protection might permit:
On the whole, when we fully consider this matter, and fully investigate the
powers granted, explicitly given, and specially delegated, we shall find Con-
gress possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less in-
auspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of
Christendom: I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition.
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is
the consideration, that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine,
what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes.
They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of
punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional
check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild in-
struments of their discipline.389
Just as John Adams, two decades earlier, had accused England of seeking to
revive the Star Chamber and Court of High Commission by extending the
jurisdiction of the admiralty court, so Abraham Holmes raised the spectacle
of a future federal government exploiting the gaps in common law protec-
386 See Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. 15 (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in
LETTERS, supra note 380, at 97, 103 ("In the civil law process the trial by jury is unknown; the conse-
quence is, that a few judges and dependent officers, possess all the power in the judicial department.
Instead of the open fair proceedings of the common law, where witnesses are examined in open court,
and may be cross examined by the parties concemed-where council is allowed, &c. we see in the civil
law process judges alone, who always, long previous to the trial, are known and often corrupted by min-
isterial influence, or by parties. Judges once influenced, soon become inclined to yield to temptations,
and to decree for him who will pay the most for their partiality.").
387 See, e.g., Brutus No. 14 (Feb. 28, 1788), in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 234-39 (Morton Bor-
den ed., 1965); Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 234
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
388 See Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in
LETTERS, supra note 380.
389 2 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note t, at 111.
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tion left open by the federal Constitution to create a new Inquisition that
would use implements of torture to try and punish defendants.
Underlying all of these Antifederalist arguments was a deep distrust of
governmental power unrestrained by specific, enforceable, fundamental
rights.39° Thus, several Antifederalists proposed that the Constitution
should be amended to include a bill of rights that would explicitly bind the
federal government not to violate common law rights, particularly in the
area of judicial process.391 For example, Richard Henry Lee proposed adop-
tion of a federal bill of rights that would include a variety of common law
protections, including a requirement that "excessive Bail, excessive Fines,
or cruel and unusual punishments should not be demanded or inflicted." '392
Similarly, the dissenting delegates to Pennsylvania's convention for ratify-
ing the Constitution argued that it should not be adopted without a bill of
rights that provided, among other things, that "excessive bail ought not to
be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel nor unusual punishments
inflicted." '393 Without a bill of rights of sufficient breadth and specificity to
restrain some future government's impulses toward cruelty and tyranny-
particularly in the area of criminal trials and punishments-the Antifederal-
ists held that it should not be adopted.
2. "Unusual" in the Virginia Convention for Ratification of the
United States Constitution.-The Antifederalist challenge to the new Con-
stitution came to a head at the Virginia ratification convention. When the
Virginia delegates met, nine states had already ratified the new Constitu-
tion, which was technically enough to put it into effect. It was generally be-
lieved, however, that the new system could not work without the
participation of Virginia, which was one of the two largest and most pros-
perous states.394
390 As the Letters from the Federal Farmer put it, "We are not to suppose all our people are at-
tached to free government, and the principles of the common law." Letter from the Federal Farmer to
the Republican No.18 (Jan. 25, 1788), reprinted in LETTERS, supra note 380, at 122, 130. Unless com-
mon law rights were stated specifically in an enforceable, written constitution, there was every reason to
suppose that the federal government would abandon common law constraints and begin acting in a ty-
rannical manner.
391 See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers'Bill
of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 157-60 (2001).
392 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Elbridge Gerry (Sept. 29, 1787), in 24 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 343, at 451, 452. Lee also sought to ensure "[t]hat
the trial by Jury in Criminal and Civil cases, and the modes prescribed by the Common Law for safety of
Life in Criminal prosecutions shall be held sacred." Id.
393 THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION, OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS I, col. 3 (Dec. 12, 1787), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/service/rbc/bdsdcc/cO40l/0OOl.jpg. The dissenting delegates also sought to en-
sure that the right to "jury trial in criminal and civil cases, by an impartial jury of the vicinage or county,
with the common law proceedings, for the safety of the accused in criminal prosecutions" would be pro-
tected. Id. at 2, col. 3, available at http://memory.loc.gov/service/rbc/bdsdcc/c04Ol/OOO2.jpg.
394 See RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 162.
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The leaders of the Antifederalists in the Virginia ratifying convention
were Patrick Henry and George Mason.395 As noted above, Mason had re-
fused to vote for the Constitution because it neither provided a bill of rights
nor gave the American people the protection of the common law. Henry
had been prominent in the American Revolution and in Virginia govern-
ment, and his prestige within the state was second only to that of George
Washington.396 Henry had been offered a place in the Virginia delegation to
the Constitutional Convention but turned it down, declaring that he "smelt a
rat. 
397
The primary Antifederalist strategy at the Virginia ratifying convention
was to attack the Federalist claim that the limited, enumerated powers in the
Constitution were not broad enough to create a real danger of federal tyr-
anny. More specifically, during the ratification debate, the Antifederalists
went through the Constitution phrase by phrase and clause by clause, with
the purpose of demonstrating that the seemingly bland, straightforward text
was actually awash with implied powers and dangerous implications.3 98
Patrick Henry was particularly effective at this mode of constitutional
critique. Throughout the debates, Henry repeatedly returned to the theme
that the Constitution gave the federal government powers not known at
common law and was thus a dangerous authorization for "new and unusual
experiments in government."3 99 Specifically, Henry identified three powers
that would enable the federal government to engage in unusual, and there-
fore tyrannical, activities: the treaty power, the power to call forth the mili-
tia, and the power to punish crime.
a. "Unusual punishments" and the treaty power.-The treaty
power granted to the federal government under the Constitution was a
source of particular concern for the Antifederalists, because it raised the
possibility that the President and a majority of the Senate could collude
with each other and with a foreign government to the detriment of states, or
even to the detriment of individual rights.4"' Under Article II, Section 2, the
President of the United States was given the power to enter into treaties
with foreign nations, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Sen-
ate.4"' Under Article VI, treaties were held to be part of the "supreme Law
395 See id. at 167.
396 See id. at 165.
397 See id.
398 See generally 3 ELLIoTr's DEBATES, supra note '.
399 Id. at 172.
400 See id. at 500 ("Mr. HENRY begged gentlemen to consider the condition this country would be
in if two thirds of a quorum should be empowered to make a treaty: they might relinquish and alienate
territorial rights, and our most valuable commercial advantages. In short, if any thing should be left us,
it would be because the President and senators were pleased to admit it. The power of making treaties,
by this Constitution, ill-guarded as it is, extended farther than it did in any country in the world.").
401 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
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of the Land" that must be given effect even if it conflicts with state law or a
state constitution. °2 Thus, the President and the Senate alone could enter
into binding agreements with foreign governments that had the effect of
nullifying state law.
Although the Antifederalists were mainly concerned about the poten-
tial of the treaty power to harm states' rights, Henry focused his argument
largely on the possibility that the treaty power could subject individual citi-
zens to "unusual punishments.""4 3 Specifically, he referred to an incident
from the reign of Queen Anne, which was described in Blackstone's Com-
mentaries. The Russian ambassador to England at that time was a profli-
gate spender who ran up debts he could not pay back. Ultimately, he was
publicly arrested and imprisoned for debt. When the Czar learned of this,
he angrily demanded that the person responsible for arresting the ambassa-
dor be handed over for execution. Queen Anne apologized that she could
not do this because there was no preexisting law of ambassadorial immu-
nity, and therefore it was not illegal to arrest the ambassador. Thus, the law
would not permit the Queen to punish the man responsible for the arrest.4"
Things would be different, Henry argued, under the new federal treaty
power:
But how is it here? Treaties are binding, notwithstanding our laws and consti-
tutions. Let us illustrate this fatal instance. Suppose the case of the Russian
ambassador to happen here. The President can settle it by a treaty, and have
the man arrested, and punished according to the Russian manner. The consti-
tutions of these states may be most flagrantly violated without remedy.... A
treaty may be made giving away your rights, and inflicting unusual punish-
ments on its violators. It is contended that, if the king of Great Britain makes a
treaty within the line of his prerogative, it is the law of the land. I agree that
this is proper, and, if I could see the same checks in that paper which I see in
the British government, I would consent to it. Can the English monarch make
a treaty which shall subvert the common law of England, and the constitution?
Dare he make a treaty that shall violate Magna Charta, or the bill of rights?
Dare he do any thing derogatory to the honor, or subversive of the great privi-
leges, of his people? No, sir. If he did, it would be nugatory, and the attempt
would endanger his existence.4 5
Because the federal government-unlike the kings and queens of Eng-
land-would not be bound by the common law, there was nothing to re-
strain it from entering into treaties calling for "unusual punishments," that
is, punishments that were contrary to long usage. As the story of the Rus-
402 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
403 3 ELLIOTT's DEBATES, supra note t, at 503.
404 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *254-55.
405 3 ELLIOTT's DEBATES, supra note t, at 503-04.
1805
102:1739 (2008)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sian ambassador indicates, one form of "unusual" punishment could be pun-
ishment for conduct that was legal at the time it was committed.4"6
b. "Unusual and severe punishments" and the power to call
forth the militia.-Henry also expressed concern that Congress's power un-
der Article I, Section 8 to "raise and support armies," to "[call] forth the Mi-
litia to execute the Laws of the Union," and to "provide for... disciplining,
the Militia" would enable the federal government to use military force to
enslave the American people. More specifically, Henry asserted that the
federal government could use "unusual and severe" methods to discipline
the militia, and thus turn it into a willing tool of despotism:
Your men who go to Congress are not restrained by a bill of rights. They are
not restrained from inflicting unusual and severe punishments, though the bill
of rights of Virginia forbids it. What will be the consequence? They may in-
flict the most cruel and ignominious punishments on the militia, and they will
tell you that it is necessary for their discipline." 7
Under such discipline, Henry contended, the militia could be "enslave[d]"
and could then be used to enslave the American people.4"' Because Con-
gress's power over the militia would not be confined by the "usual" re-
straints in punishing soldiers,4 9 Congress could use the militia to transform
the United States into a "government of force."410
c. "Cruel and unusual punishments" and the power to prose-
cute crime.-Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, Henry asserted
that the federal government's power to try and punish those accused of
crime was dangerous because the federal government was not required to
conform either to common law principles or to a bill of rights. Therefore,
in criminal trials, Congress would be free to discard common law protec-
406 George Mason supported Henry's argument, asserting that in England, "[t]he common law...
has prevented the power of the crown from destroying the immunities of the people," but that no such
common law restraint would apply to the President's exercise of the treaty power. Id. at 508. Of course,
a punishment for conduct that was legal at the time it was committed would arguably violate the prohibi-
tion on ex post facto laws, stated in Article I, Section 9. But since the ex post facto prohibition is stated
as a limitation on the legislative power of Congress and not on the President's treaty power, it is not en-
tirely clear that this prohibition would cover treaties.
407 Id. at412.
408 Id. at 411 ("We are told, we are afraid to trust ourselves; that our own representatives-
Congress-will not exercise their powers oppressively; that we shall not enslave ourselves; that the mili-
tia cannot enslave themselves, &c. Who has enslaved France, Spain, Germany, Turkey, and other coun-
tries which groan under tyranny? They have been enslaved by the hands of their own people. If it will
be so in America, it will be only as it has been every where else.").
409 Cf WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 398 (2d ed. 1920) (noting that the
discretion exercised by courts martial in imposing punishments on soldiers is generally limited by the
United States Constitution, statutory law, and "military usage").
410 3 ELLIoTT's DEBATES, supra note t, at 411.
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tions, such as the right to trial before an impartial jury in the vicinage. 411
Defendants would also lose the right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-
ishments, which was an ancient common law right that was also protected
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights:
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the re-
striction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your
declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors? That they would
not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may
introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law.
They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany of torturing,
to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw
examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you
that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they
must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to pun-
ish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone.412
Henry's argument is notable for its consistency with the arguments we have
seen above regarding the inherent reasonableness of the common law and
the close association of innovation with cruelty. Like Coke, Blackstone,
Adams, Abraham Holmes, and others, Henry argued that the custom and
long usage of the common law-on its own and as reflected in state bills of
rights-was the best source of protection for individual liberty during the
criminal process, for it ensured fair trial procedures and forbids torture as
well as cruel and barbarous punishments. Also like Coke, Blackstone, Ad-
ams, and Holmes, Henry argued that if Congress is left free to experiment
and innovate in the realm of criminal punishment, it might well adopt the
cruel civil law system of Europe, with its propensity for "torture" and "re-
lentless severity." '413
Henry and Mason were so successful in arguing against ratification of
the Constitution in Virginia that the Federalists ultimately offered a com-
promise, much like the compromise that had been reached earlier by the
Massachusetts ratifying convention: Virginia would ratify the Constitution
and simultaneously recommend adoption of a bill of rights.4t4 This com-
promise was sufficient to assure ratification within Virginia, which oc-
curred on June 25, 1788. Immediately thereafter, a committee was chosen
to propose amendments to the Constitution, and both Mason and Henry
were given places on the committee. Ultimately, the committee adopted a
proposed bill of rights that included virtually the entire contents of the Vir-
411 Although the Constitution required that criminal trials take place before a jury in the state where
the crime was committed, Henry was concerned that the defendant might be taken to a far distant part of
the state where he would be a stranger to the jury and where the jury might even have a bias against him.
Id. at 447.
412 Id. at 447-48.
413 Id.
414 See RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 171.
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ginia Declaration of Rights, including the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments, as well as numerous other proposed amendments." 5
3. Adoption of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the
United States Constitution.-The Virginia convention for ratifying the
United States Constitution was the first state convention to propose that the
Constitution be amended to include a prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishments. The states that followed Virginia in ratifying the Constitution-
New York,416 North Carolina," 7 and Rhode Island 4 8-all repeated Vir-
ginia's recommendation, but none of these states debated the matter.
Although James Madison had opposed a bill of rights in the Virginia
ratifying convention, he came around to the view of the Antifederalists that
a bill of rights would empower the Judiciary to act as a watchdog against
federal violations of individual rights.4"9 Madison ultimately drafted and
presented to the First Congress a bill of rights that closely followed Vir-
ginia's Declaration of Rights4.. and included many of the recommendations
of the Virginia ratifying convention, including the recommendation that the
Constitution include a prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. In
proposing his plan to the House of Representatives, Madison noted that af-
ter enactment of the Bill of Rights, "independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights...
[and] resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated ... by the
declaration of rights."4 '' Most of Madison's proposal, including the prohi-
bition on cruel and unusual punishments, was adopted verbatim.
Almost none of the debate over the Bill of Rights in the First Congress
focused specifically on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Indeed,
the only substantive commentary came from Samuel Livermore, who re-
marked: "The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I
do not think it necessary.... No cruel and unusual punishment is to be in-
flicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve
whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off, but are we, in future, to be
prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?" '422
Representative Smith also made a brief objection that the clause was too
415 See id. at 174.
416 See I ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note t, at 328.
417 See 4 id. at 244.
418 See l id. at 335.419 Thomas Jefferson shared this view as well. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Mar. 15, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 161-63 (1905) (noting that one
of the attractions of a bill of rights was "the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary").
420 See RUTLAND, supra note 55, at 202.
421 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (Joseph Gales ed., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
422 Id. at 754.
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"indefinite. 423 After this, the Eighth Amendment was passed without fur-
ther debate.
The remarks of Smith and Livermore about the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause's supposed vagueness are sometimes taken as evidence
to support the notion that even the Framers of the Bill of Rights had no
clear idea what it meant, and that we should therefore feel free to depart
from textual interpretation when considering whether a given punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment. But at least two key facts about the debate
in the First Congress tend to undercut this notion.
First, the statements of Representatives Livermore and Smith merely
represent the views of two members of the First Congress (out of a total of
ninety-one members of the House and Senate). There is no evidence that
any other member of Congress shared their concern regarding the possible
vagueness of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Second, Livermore himself does not appear to have been within the
mainstream of eighteenth-century thought regarding the usefulness of
common law precedent generally. In deciding cases as a justice of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, Livermore reportedly refused to recognize the
authority of precedent--despite the fact that the common law applied in
New Hampshire-holding instead that "every tub should stand on its own
bottom. 4 24 Given that Livermore's general position was that common law
precedent was of limited efficacy at best, it is not surprising that he consid-
ered the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which requires courts to
compare new punishments to those accepted at common law, to be unac-
ceptably vague. Given the apparently exceptional nature of his thoughts on
the common law, Livermore's views should not be mistaken for those of
most of his contemporaries.
Ultimately, the most significant evidence we have regarding the pub-
licly understood meaning of the word "unusual" in the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause comes from the Virginia convention for ratifying the
United States Constitution. In that debate, the term "unusual" was used
generally to signify the Antifederalists' concern that the federal government
would not be bound by the constraints of the common law and might exer-
cise new and tyrannical powers. In the context of criminal punishment, the
term "unusual" signified the danger that the federal government might in-
novate or experiment in criminal punishment-a process that had often led
to greater cruelty in the past and that might lead in the same direction in the
future. Indeed, the Framers shared with Coke the opinion that innovation in
punishment often led to torture and barbarity.425 The word "unusual" in the
423 Id.
424 REINSCH, supra note 331, at 27-28.
425 For example, Abraham Holmes's fear that the new federal government would employ "cruel and
unheard-of punishments" such as those associated with the Inquisition, including "racks and gibbets,"
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Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was meant to be a check on the fed-
eral government's ability to innovate in punishment. This is the only plau-
sible meaning of the word as used in the Eighth Amendment.
F. The Meaning of "Unusual" in the Early Caselaw
In the first half-century after adoption of the Eighth Amendment, only
a few published cases concerned the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. All of these cases were decided in state court, and
many of them concerned state, rather than federal, bills of rights. Still, a
number of these cases shed important light on the publicly understood
meaning of the word "unusual" in the decades after adoption of the Eighth
Amendment. In particular, they demonstrate that courts interpreting the
phrase "cruel and unusual" in the early Republic nearly universally inter-
preted the word "unusual" to mean contrary to the long usage of the com-
mon law.
1. Unusual Punishments and Common Law Precedent.-In a number
of cases during the first half of the nineteenth century, state courts held that
a punishment could not be "unusual" within the meaning of the phrase
"cruel and unusual punishments" if the punishment was permissible at
common law. For example, in Barker v. People426 the Supreme Court of
New York upheld a New York statute that disenfranchised those convicted
of dueling, noting that "[t]he disfranchisement of a citizen is not an unusual
punishment; [at common law] it was the consequence of treason, and of in-
famous crimes, and it was altogether discretionary in the legislature to ex-
tend that punishment to other offences." '427 Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Wyatt,42 the General Court of Virginia upheld a statute that gave the court
discretion to order the whipping of those convicted of setting up illegal
gaming operations against an Eighth Amendment challenge: "The punish-
ment of offences by stripes is certainly odious, but cannot be said to be un-
usual," because the discretion to impose whipping under the statute was "of
the same character with the discretion always exercised by Common Law
Courts to inflict fine and imprisonment, and subject to be restrained by the
same considerations." '429 In People v. Potter,43 ° the Supreme Court of New
strongly echoes Coke's assertion that the Rack was introduced to England by those who sought to inno-
vate by introducing the civil law into a common law country. See supra Part III.B. 1, E. 1.
426 20 Johns. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
427 Id. at 459. In a later opinion, the court clarified that the plaintiff's claim should also be rejected
because the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states: "The provision in the constitution of the
United States, that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, is a restriction upon the gov-
ernment of the United States only; and not upon the government of any state." Barker v. People, 3 Cow.
686, 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
428 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 694 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1828).
429 Id. at 701.
430 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846).
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York upheld the validity of the governor's decision to require the defendant
to accept banishment as a condition of pardon for the crime of larceny be-
cause banishment was a traditional, common law punishment: "[T]he gov-
ernor may grant a pardon on a condition which does not subject the prisoner
to an unusual or cruel punishment. Banishment is neither. It is sanctioned
by authority, and has been inflicted, in this form, from the foundation of our
government."43' In each of these cases, the punishment was upheld simply
because it was "usual"; that is, it was consistent with the long usage of the
common law.
Similarly, early American courts sometimes struck down punishments
as cruel and unusual precisely because they violated common law stan-
dards, even though the punishments did not involve the infliction of pain or
degradation. For example, in Jones v. Commonwealth,43 the district court
had imposed a joint fine as punishment on four defendants who had been
convicted of assaulting a magistrate in the performance of his duties. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia struck down this punishment, hold-
ing that it violated the requirement in the Virginia Declaration of Rights
"that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." '433 Specifically, the Court held
that under the common law
where there are several defendants a joint award of one fine against all is erro-
neous, as it ought to be several against each defendant; for otherwise he who
hath paid his proportionable part might be continued in prison until all the oth-
ers had paid theirs. Which would be, in fact, to punish him for the offence of
another.434
Because the joint fine violated this basic common law precept, it constituted
an "excessive fine" and a "cruel and unusual punishment. 43
5
In only one instance did a court from the first half of the nineteenth
century appear not to realize that "unusual" means "contrary to long usage."
In Aldridge v. Commonwealth,436 the General Court of Virginia considered a
challenge to a state larceny law that had been recently amended to increase
the punishment that could be imposed on a "free person of color" convicted
of this offense. Whereas the statute had previously authorized a sentence of
431 Id. at 245.
432 5 Va. (1 Call) 555 (1799).
433 Id. at 557. The Jones court also held that the joint fine violated a Virginia statute that required
that in all indictments, "the fine or amercement ought to be according to the degree of the fault and the
estate of the defendant." Id.
434 Id. at 558.
435 Id. The Jones court did not distinguish between "fines" and "punishments," probably because in
the eighteenth century, fines were themselves an extremely common form of punishment, and because
the failure to pay a fine could result in lengthy imprisonment, which is itself a quintessential form of
punishment.
436 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824).
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up to three years imprisonment on all offenders, it was amended to permit a
"free person of color" who committed larceny to be whipped, "sold as a
slave, and transported and banished beyond the limits of the United
States." '437 The defendant-a free person of color-challenged the statute as
imposing cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Virginia's Declara-
tion of Rights. The court rejected this claim, holding that the Declaration of
Rights only applied to white people, not to blacks.438 Then, in dicta, the
court went on to say that even if the Declaration of Rights applied to free
blacks, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would not forbid this
punishment:
That provision was never designed to control the Legislative right to determine
ad libitum upon the adequacy of punishment, but is merely applicable to the
modes of punishment.... [W]hen this Bill of Rights was declared ... we
knew that the best heads and hearts of the land of our ancestors, had long and
loudly declaimed against the wanton cruelty of many of the punishments prac-
tised in other countries; and this section in the Bill of Rights, was framed ef-
fectually to exclude these, so that no future Legislature, in a moment perhaps
of great and general excitement, should be tempted to disgrace our Code by the
introduction of any of those odious modes of punishment.439
The Aldridge court's reading of Virginia's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause to cover only the "odious modes of punishment"" employed
in the European civil law system is not justifiable in light of the publicly
understood meaning of the word "unusual" at the time the Eighth Amend-
ment was adopted. Indeed, the Aldridge dicta is inconsistent with other
cases decided in Virginia both before and after Aldridge was decided. As
noted above, in both Jones v. Commonwealth" 1 and Commonwealth v.
Wyatt," the court considered whether the challenged punishment was con-
sistent with common law principles, not whether the punishment involved
an inherently cruel method. Indeed, in Jones (decided a mere nine years af-
ter the Eighth Amendment was adopted) the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia struck down the imposition of a joint fine-which was not even
arguably an inherently cruel mode of punishment-because it violated the
common law principle that a person should only be punished for his own
crimes.443
The transformation of larceny from a crime punishable by a maximum
three years imprisonment into a crime permitting certain offenders to be
whipped, sold as slaves, and banished is clearly innovative, and thus un-
437 Id. at 447-48.
438 Id. at 449.
439 Id. at 450.
440 Id.
441 5 Va. (1 Call) 555 (1799).
442 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 694 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1828).
443 5 Va. (I Call) at 558.
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usual. By any reasonable standard, it is also profoundly cruel. Indeed, the
punishment approved in Aldridge is strongly analogous to that paradigm of
cruel and unusual punishment, the judgment imposed on Titus Oates. In
both cases, the defendant was given a new combination of traditional pun-
ishments that, taken together, exceeded the scope of any punishment previ-
ously permitted for the crime.' For Oates, the punishment consisted of
whipping, life imprisonment, fines, pillorying, and defrocking." 5 For Aid-
ridge, the punishment consisted of whipping, enslavement, and banish-
ment." 6 Both defendants received punishment far in excess of what had
previously been permitted for the crime. In short, Aldridge presents a clas-
sic example of cruel and unusual punishment, and the contrary dicta in that
case is plainly incorrect.
2. Becoming Unusual: Traditional Punishments that Fall Out of Us-
age.-Although American courts in the first half of the nineteenth century
recognized that a punishment could only be "usual" if it enjoyed long us-
age, they did not make the mistake of presuming that every punishment that
was used long ago must still be considered acceptable. In the seventeenth
century, Coke wrote: "Custome ... lose[s its] ... being, if usage faile." 7
Similarly, American courts in the first half of the nineteenth century recog-
nized that when a traditional common law punishment falls completely out
of usage, it loses the presumption of validity that comes with being usual.
This issue was treated extensively in James v. Commonwealth,"' in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to consider whether a woman
convicted of being a common scold"9 could be subjected to the ducking
stool45 ° as a punishment.45' The ducking stool was not authorized by statute
in Pennsylvania, but it had been the traditional common law punishment for
444 See supra Part II.B.2.
445 See id.
446 See Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 447-48 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824).
447 COKE, COPYHOLDER, supra note 169, at 564.
448 12 Serg. & Rawle 220 (Pa. 1825).
449 A scold was traditionally defined as "[a] person who regularly breaks the peace by scolding
people, increasing discord, and generally being a public nuisance to the neighborhood." BLACK'S LAW
DICTiONARY 1374 (8th ed. 2004) (entry for "scold").
450 "Ducking stool" is synonymous with "castigatory," which is defined as "[a] device for punishing
scolds by repeatedly plunging them underwater." Id. at 231 (entry for "castigatory").
451 12 Serg. & Rawle 220. The defendant argued that the punishment violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments and the Pennsylvania Constitution's ban on "cruel
punishments." The court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states and that therefore
there was no need to inquire whether the punishment was "cruel and unusual." Nonetheless, because the
punishment for scolding was not specified by statute, the court was required to ask whether the ducking
stool was permitted by the usage of the common law. In other words, despite the fact that the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution outlawed simply cruel punishments, the court devoted all of its analysis to the ques-
tion of whether the punishment was unusual. Indeed, since the court found that the common law did not
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this crime. Thus, the court was required to consider whether this punish-
ment continued to be permitted by the common law of Pennsylvania.
As a starting point, the court recognized that the common law was con-
stituted by usage, and that therefore, if a traditional punishment ceases to be
used, it also ceases to be part of the common law.452 The court then found
three separate reasons for concluding that the ducking stool lacked usage
and was thus not authorized by the common law. First, it appeared that in
England, no one had been subjected to ducking since the middle of the sev-
enteenth century. Just as English laws calling for the execution of witches
and gypsies had gone unused for over one hundred years and had thus been
effectively "repealed by the voice of humanity, and not by positive law," '453
similarly the common law punishment of ducking had lost its validity be-
cause it fell into long disuse: "The long disuetude of any law amounts to its
repeal." '454 Second, the court held that although ducking was used in Eng-
land, it had never become part of the common law usage of Pennsylvania.455
Third, the court held that even if ducking had somehow been part of the
Pennsylvania common law, it was implicitly disallowed in 1790, when the
Pennsylvania legislature outlawed the pillory and the whipping post.456
As James demonstrates, there were three primary ways in which a tra-
ditional common law punishment could cease to be authorized by the com-
mon law (and thus become "unusual"). The punishment could fall
completely out of usage for a long period of time; it could be used in Eng-
land, but not America (and thus never attain "usual" status on this side of
the Atlantic); or it could be disallowed by legislative reform. Should any of
these three events occur, a punishment formerly authorized by the common
law would become unusual and would lose its presumption of reasonable-
ness and validity.
In conclusion, American courts of the first half of the-nineteenth cen-
tury shared the Framers' understanding that the word "unusual" in the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause meant "contrary to long usage." They
generally upheld punishments that were consonant with common law
precedent and were willing to strike down those that were not, even if such
452 Id. at 228 ("The common law.., what is it, but common usage?").
453 Id. at 227.
454 Id. at 228.
455 Id. at 233 ("[T]he common-law punishment of ducking was not received nor embodied by usage
so as to become a part of the common law of Pennsylvania. It was rejected, as not accommodated to the
circumstances of the country, and against all the notions of punishment entertained by this primitive and
humane community.").
456 See id. at 231 (noting that "[tihe object of the framers of the act of 1790, was the abolition of all
infamous, disgraceful, public punishments-all cruel and unnatural punishments-for all the classes of
minor offences and misdemeanors, to which they had been before applied." Because ducking was, like
whipping and the pillory, an "infamous, disgraceful, public punishment," the court reasoned that the leg-
islature would have forbidden it had it known that the punishment was still permitted by the common
law.).
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punishments did not involve the infliction of physical pain or degradation.
Moreover, American courts in this period demonstrated awareness that even
traditional common law punishments could become unusual if they actually
fell out of usage. Only one early case took the position-and only in
dicta-that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was limited to in-
herently cruel modes of punishment, such as those used in the European
civil law system that were already unthinkable in eighteenth-century Amer-
ica. This dictum should be accorded little weight, however, as it was incon-
sistent with the great weight of authority regarding the meaning of the text,
including two other cases decided in the same general time period by the
highest court of the same state.457
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECOGNIZING THE ORIGINAL
MEANING OF "UNUSUAL"
In this final Part, I briefly sketch out the jurisprudential implications of
recognizing the original meaning of unusual. Section A demonstrates the
key differences between a test that focuses on whether a given punishment
accords with evolving standards of decency and a test that asks whether the
punishment is contrary to long usage. Sections B and C briefly discuss the
implications of this newly recognized standard for the Court's proportional-
ity and death penalty jurisprudence, respectively. Section D touches upon
some of the implications of this standard for state constitutions that include
prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishments. Finally, section E identifies
several unresolved issues that are beyond the scope of this article.
A. Evolving Standards Versus Long Usage
Recognition of the original meaning of the word "unusual" in the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause resolves a major, previously unrecognized
ambiguity that has underlain the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence. Such recognition establishes that the phrase "unusual Punish-
ments" does not refer to punishments that are rare or out of the ordinary, but
rather to punishments that are contrary to long usage. To put it in some-
what more familiar language, an unusual punishment is one that is "con-
trary to our longstanding traditions."
The resolution of this ambiguity goes a long way toward resolving the
vagueness problems that have bedeviled the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence under the current evolving standards of decency
test, and thus permits the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to provide
a firmer foundation for protecting the rights of persons convicted of crimes.
457 Ultimately, Aldridge is only explicable as an expression of racial animus. The opinion may ap-
propriately be summarized as follows: "Free persons of color have no rights, and even if they do, defen-
dants here still lose."
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As noted above, there are two major flaws inherent in the evolving
standards of decency test. First, it is irredeemably vague. Who decides
what comports with current standards of decency and what does not?
Should the Court rely upon objective criteria or its own subjective judg-
ment? If it relies on objective criteria, which criteria should it use, and how
should such criteria be employed? These questions have never been an-
swered adequately and may be unanswerable. Thus, the evolving standards
of decency test has left the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as a
vague provision that is highly subject to judicial manipulation.
The second major flaw underlying the evolving standards of decency
test is that it is not designed to protect criminal defendants when public
opinion becomes enflamed against them. The evolving standards of de-
cency test relies upon the presumption that history is inherently "progres-
sive. 4""' Indeed, the very words of this test repeatedly evoke such a
worldview: "evolving," "progress,". "maturing society."459 The test pre-
sumes that that which is "newer" can also be expected to be kinder, gentler,
and possessed of more "decency.""46 The history of criminal punishment
has not borne out this view of the world. Societal moral standards do not
necessarily get more humane and decent over time. Sometimes they move
in the opposite direction. When public opinion becomes enflamed and
prone to cruelty, the evolving standards of decency test can do little to stop
the resulting cruel punishments, for the very popularity of such punishments
is a strong indicator that they comport with current standards of decency.
The original meaning of "unusual" leads us in the opposite direction.
The evolving standards of decency test directs courts' attention toward tra-
ditional punishments and asks them to decide whether such punishments
still comply with current standards of decency. By contrast, the original
meaning of "unusual" directs courts' attention toward new punishments and
asks them to decide whether such punishments are consonant with our long-
standing traditions. In other words, the Clause reflects the profound com-
mitment to traditional practice and the profound distrust of innovation
reflected in the writings of Edward Coke and other proponents of the com-
mon law.
The Cokean notion of long usage does provide for the development of
the law, but a different sort of development than envisioned by Chief Jus-
tice Warren in Trop. In contrast to Warren's notion of the evolutionary
movement from primitive to modem, Coke saw legal development as being
like the refinement of gold in a fire. As the metal is worked in the fire over
time, the gold separates from the dross-the pure from the impure-and the
458 Cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970);
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000).
459 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
460 Id.
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dross falls away. Legal practices that have been used for a long time, and
that continue to be used, are the pure gold of the law: beautiful, durable,
strong, and useful. Examples of such gold include the right to habeas cor-
pus, due process of law, trial by jury in the vicinage of the offense, and the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. The dross of the law,
on the other hand, consists both of old legal practices that ultimately came
to be rejected or discarded-such as the ducking stool46-and of new or
"innovative" legal practices that tend to undermine the rights protected by
long usage-for example, the attempt by British authorities in the 1770s to
try Americans before the admiralty court in order to avoid giving American
defendants the benefit of trial before sympathetic local juries.
Recognizing that the word "unusual" in the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause means "contrary to long usage" will greatly reduce the
vagueness problem that is currently associated with the clause. It is a rela-
tively simple task to determine whether or not the imposition of a given
punishment for a given crime is significantly harsher than the punishments
that have preceded it-indeed, a much simpler task than determining
whether a punishment complies with current standards of decency. Because
this task is relatively simple and determinate, it reduces the vagueness asso-
ciated with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Before considering
whether a given punishment is unacceptably cruel, the court must first de-
cide whether it is contrary to long usage. If not, the analysis ends there. If
so, the court must decide whether it is also cruel. If the harshness associ-
ated with the new punishment is equal to or lesser than the harshness asso-
ciated with the traditional punishment, then the new punishment is unusual
but not cruel. If the harshness associated with the new punishment is sig-
nificantly greater than the punishment practices authorized by tradition,
then it may be both cruel and unusual.
Proper recognition of the original meaning of "unusual" will make the
Eighth Amendment a much better and more coherent source of protection
for criminal offenders than it is under the evolving standards of decency
test, because offenders' rights will no longer depend upon the vicissitudes
of public opinion. Criminals are among the most despised of all groups in
society, and if their safety depends on current public opinion as to which
punishments are acceptable, they will receive very little protection from the
Eighth Amendment. When public opinion turns against a certain group of
offenders-as it has currently turned against sex offenders, for example-
and the legislature responds by inventing new forms of penal cruelty, the
Eighth Amendment will provide no bar. The popularity of such laws will
be evidence that they meet current standards of decency. If courts are re-
quired to compare new punishments to the long usage of the common law,
on the other hand, criminal laws that result from temporarily enflamed pub-
lic opinion are much more likely to be struck down.
461 See supra Part III.F.2
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Recognition of the original meaning of the word "unusual" would also
potentially bring a broader range of punishments within the scope of Eighth
Amendment review. The modem practice of imprisonment is itself a pro-
found innovation.462 In the eighteenth century, crimes were typically pun-
ished with fines, corporal punishment, public humiliation, banishment, or
execution. Imprisonment was rarely used and sentences of more than a few
years were almost never imposed. Moreover, the modem prison, in which
prisoners are completely segregated from society and sometimes subjected
to coercive "treatment" for their criminogenic characteristics,463 was not
bom until 1790 and did not achieve anything like its current form until the
end of the nineteenth century.4" And certainly, the current regime of long
mandatory minimum sentences, life sentences for some first-time drug of-
fenders, chemical castration and similar indignities for sex offenders, as
well as assorted other punishments, are all new. These changes reflect cer-
tain fundamental reorientations in criminal punishment: from public to pri-
vate, from short-term pain or humiliation to long-term incapacitation and
segregation, from retributive justice to social control.465 These changes
have all been made in the name of "reform" and under the "progressive" as-
sumptions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scientism. Although some
of these reforms have clearly bettered the lot of criminal offenders, it is not
clear that they all have done so. It would be extraordinarily useful to com-
pare current penological theory and practice to the principles and precedents
underlying the common law to determine whether some of our "reforms"
have actually pushed us in the direction of unacceptable cruelty.
Finally, a proper recognition of the original meaning of "unusual" will
permit an interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that
is not inexorably tied to the standards of the eighteenth century, unlike the
originalist account provided by Justice Scalia. Under Justice Scalia's read-
ing of the clause, any punishment that was permitted at the time of the
Eighth Amendment's ratification must necessarily be permitted today be-
cause Justice Scalia sees the clause as embodying the standards of decency
that prevailed in 1790. But as is shown above, the word "unusual" is not di-
462 See generally THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN
WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
463 For a discussion of some of the most predominant "treatments" for criminogenic characteristics
of one major class of criminal offenders, see generally PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 99-147, 211-81 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q.
LaFond eds., 2003). See also Stinneford, supra note 44, and sources cited therein.
464 See NICOLE HAHN RAFTER & DEBRA STANLEY, PRISONS IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE
1ANDBOOK (1999); Matthew W. Meskell, An American Resolution: The History of Prisons in the
United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REv. 839 (1999); David J. Rothman, Perfecting the
Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 111 (Norval Morris &
David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
465 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retro-
spective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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rected toward the question of whether a punishment comports with public
opinion at any given point in time. Rather, it is directed toward the ques-
tion of whether a punishment is inherently reasonable as measured against
the long usage of the common law. If a punishment enjoys long usage, this
is powerful evidence of reasonableness because it has enjoyed the consent
of the people over a long period of time. If a punishment does not enjoy
long usage, either because it is completely new or because it is being rein-
troduced after having fallen out of usage for a significant period of time,
then it does not enjoy any presumption of reasonableness. Not only the
ducking stool, but also the whipping post, the pillory, mutilation, and exe-
cution for anything but the most serious offenses have all fallen completely
out of usage. These punishments are now unusual because they have not
continued to withstand the test of time. In Cokean terms, they are now pre-
sumptively dross rather than gold. If any legislature sought to reintroduce
such punishments, its effort should be greeted with the same judicial skepti-
cism that should meet any other form of legal innovation in punishment.
B. Long Usage and Proportionality in Sentencing
As noted above, the Supreme Court concluded in Solem v. Helm466 that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not merely prohibit inher-
ently cruel methods of punishment, but also punishments that are grossly
disproportionate to the offense.467 The Court based its conclusion largely on
the fact that the English common law contains a principle of proportionality
and that the American Bill of Rights was generally concerned with preserv-
ing the "rights of Englishmen.""46 Therefore, the Court concluded, one of
the rights protected by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was the
right not to be subjected to punishments that are grossly disproportionate to
the offense.469
As further noted above, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion in Harmelin v.
Michigan that took the Solem Court to task for its cursory historical analy-
sis. After reviewing the English and American historical materials, Justice
Scalia concluded that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the
Eighth Amendment was only intended to prohibit inherently cruel methods
of punishment, not grossly disproportionate punishments.47
Justice Scalia's conclusion was faulty, however, because it was based
upon a misreading of the word "unusual." Justice Scalia, like Chief Justice
Warren, mistakenly believed that the word "unusual" meant "different from
that which is generally done." Therefore, he concluded that because grossly
disproportionate punishments were often imposed in England during the
466 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
467 See supra Part l.B. 1.
468 See supra Part IBI.1.
469 See supra Part I.B. 1.
470 See supra Part I.B.3.
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eighteenth century, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause cannot have
been meant to prohibit grossly disproportionate punishments.47" '
Once one recognizes that "unusual" actually means "contrary to long
usage," however, one realizes that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause almost certainly was intended to cover grossly disproportionate pun-
ishments. As the Solem Court demonstrated, numerous common law
sources, from the Magna Carta on, state that the common law requires the
punishment to be proportionate to the offense.472 If proportionality is part of
the common law, then one way-although not the only way-to be "un-
usual" is to be disproportionate. If the disproportion between crime and
sentence becomes very great, the punishment may be considered to be not
merely "unusual," but "cruel and unusual."
Indeed, the punishment inflicted on Titus Oates-the first and quintes-
sential example of a cruel and unusual punishment-demonstrates that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the English Bill of Rights was
not limited to inherently cruel methods of punishment. The punishments
inflicted on Oates-floggings, pillorying, imprisonment, and fines4-were
all methods of punishment that fell well within the common law tradition.
They were not considered inherently cruel by the standards of the seven-
teenth century. Moreover, Oates's punishment was less cruel in an absolute
sense than, for example, the punishments of drawing and quartering or
burning at the stake, both of which were permissible for the crime of trea-
son.474 Thus, if Oates's punishment was cruel and unusual, this was only
because the punishment was both unprecedented and grossly disproportion-
ate to the crime of perjury, the crime for which he was convicted.475
Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was intended to outlaw only inherently cruel methods of punishment
seems to be based less on the meaning of the Clause itself and more on the
fact that disproportionate punishments were actually permitted at the end of
the eighteenth century, at least in England. For example, as discussed
above, the death penalty was imposed in England for nearly two hundred
crimes, including minor crimes such as the cutting down of a cherry tree.476
471 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975 (1991) ("[I]n 1791, England punished over 200
crimes with death.").472 See supra Part II.B. 1.
473 See supra Part II.B.2.
474 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *376-77.
475 Justice Scalia argued that Oates's punishment arguably was proportionate to his "real crime,"
which amounted to the premeditated killing of fifteen innocent people. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 973
n.4. This may be true if proportionality were to be measured against a defendant's actual moral desert,
but this is not the standard of proportionality that seems to have been employed in Oates's case and pre-
sumably under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause generally. In Oates's case, proportionality
appears to have been measured against his crime of conviction, not his "real crime" in some absolute
moral sense. His punishment was cruel and unusual as applied to his crime, although it was objectively
less cruel than some punishments authorized for more serious crimes.
476 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2 1, at *4.
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Although it is true that the "bloody code" of the eighteenth century permit-
ted numerous instances of grossly disproportionate punishment, this fact is
not relevant to the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
either in England or America. England punished so many minor crimes
with death primarily because Parliament had spent a century enacting new
statutory penalties, most of which deviated from common law precedent.477
Blackstone himself bitterly complained about Parliament's numerous devia-
tions from the "reason" of the common law in this area." 8 Although Par-
liament's actions in this area were clearly both "cruel" and "unusual"-
contrary to long usage-the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy precluded
any challenge against them on this ground.
Because the Eighth Amendment was intended to constrain Congress as
well as the courts, there is no reason to suppose that the founding genera-
tion wished Congress to have the same power to impose arbitrary and dis-
proportionate punishments as was then enjoyed by Parliament. Indeed, the
very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to ensure that Congress did not as-
sume such arbitrary power unto itself.
Of course, it is still an open question as to whether there is a workable
standard for measuring proportionality,479 but the notion of long usage at
least reduces the potential vagueness associated with efforts to create a reli-
able measure for proportionality. It may not be practicable to measure how
much punishment a given crime "deserves" in an absolute sense, but it may
be possible to measure the punishment for a given crime against the pun-
ishments given for similar crimes over the course of this country's history.
If a punishment is so harsh in relation to the crime for which it is imposed
that it can reasonably be said to be contrary to our longstanding traditions,
then it could potentially be found to be cruel and unusual because it is
grossly disproportionate to the offense.
C. Long Usage and the Death Penalty
The impact that proper recognition of the original meaning of "un-
usual" would have on the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is
somewhat more difficult to predict. To the extent that the death penalty has
been continuously imposed for a given crime-murder, for example-over
a very long period of time, then it could not properly be found to be un-
usual. But to the extent that capital punishment has fallen out of usage for a
given crime-such as burglary or counterfeiting-any attempt to revive
477 See supra Part III.C.4.
478 See id.
479 Once one reaches the conclusion that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause encompasses
some kind of proportionality requirement, one faces the much more daunting challenge of determining
how to measure it. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?,
89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005).
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such a punishment would be unusual, and at least arguably cruel.48 And if
the state seeks to employ a more painful method of execution than has tradi-
tionally been permitted, such method could be found to be cruel and un-
usual. Thus, an innovation such as lethal injection may not pass
constitutional muster if it is shown to significantly increase the pain suf-
fered by the person being executed.48" '
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's current practice of selectively
striking down traditional applications of the death penalty that have simply
become relatively less common-the death penalty for seventeen-year-old
murderers, for example-is almost certainly not justifiable under the origi-
nal meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. But of course,
these are also cases where judicial intervention may be least necessary, be-
cause they involve punishments that are rarely imposed, and that appear to
be on the road toward elimination by the democratic process. Indeed, were
they not rarely imposed and not on the road toward elimination, the evolv-
ing standards of decency test would not permit the Court to strike them
down.
D. Long Usage and State Constitutions
State law prohibitions on cruel punishments present at least two dis-
tinct questions. First, should state law prohibitions that were roughly con-
temporaneous with the Eighth Amendment be interpreted to have the same
original meaning as the federal Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
even though some were worded differently (forbidding "cruel or unusual
punishments," or simply "cruel punishments")? Second, should current
state prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishments be interpreted to cover
precisely the same punishments as the federal prohibition, at least where the
state provision contains the same wording as the federal provision? My an-
swer to the first question is yes, and my answer to the second question is no.
The first question is partially discussed above in Part III.D.4. As de-
scribed above, at the end of the eighteenth century, the words "cruel" and
"unusual" were synonyms when employed in the context of punishment.
The word "cruel" stated the abstract moral principle, and the word "un-
usual" provided a concrete reference point for determining whether that
principle had been violated. Thus, it makes sense that some states prohib-
ited "cruel punishments," some prohibited "cruel and unusual punish-
480 The question of whether such a punishment would be cruel and unusual would be determined by
a variety of factors, including the reason it was abolished in the first place, the length of time during
which it has remained in disuse, and the relative harshness of the punishment that has replaced it.
481 The Supreme Court's recent decision upholding death by lethal injection in Baze v. Rees, 128 S.
Ct. 1520 (2008), demonstrates the continued doctrinal chaos surrounding the Court's treatment of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. In a demonstration of near-Furman-level confusion, seven
separate opinions were filed, and no opinion attracted the concurrence of more than two Justices.
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ments," and some prohibited "cruel or unusual punishments." Each formu-
lation is simply a different way of saying essentially the same thing.
With respect to the second question, given the meaning and function of
the term "unusual," it is to be expected that over time, the scope of state
prohibitions on "cruel and unusual punishments" would come to vary from
the federal provision and from each other. If a given practice falls out of
usage in a given jurisdiction over a long period of time, then it becomes
"unusual" in that jurisdiction, even if it remains "usual" in others. Thus,
over time, the precise scope of the prohibition on "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" is likely to diverge in the various jurisdictions that employ this
standard. A good example of this likely divergence may be seen by looking
briefly at Coker v. Georgia.482
In Coker, as noted above, the Supreme Court struck down the Georgia
statute authorizing the death penalty for simple rape, in large part because
Georgia was the only state that continued to impose this punishment for this
crime.483 This decision seems fairly certain to have been incorrect. If
Georgia had a long and unbroken tradition of executing rapists, there is no
reasonable way to characterize that practice as "contrary to long usage," at
least in Georgia. A longstanding, traditional punishment is simply not the
same thing as an "innovation." The same conclusion holds true if one
broadens the scope to the United States as a whole. The long continuation
of the practice of executing rapists in Georgia, a state which is part of the
national moral community encompassed by the federal Constitution, means
that the practice is not an "innovation" from a federal constitutional per-
spective either.484
There is, however, a strong basis for concluding that the execution of
rapists is contrary to long usage in those states that have banned it for a
considerable period of time. As noted in Part III.F.2, when a traditional
punishment falls out of usage for a long time, it ceases to enjoy the pre-
sumption of validity that comes with being "usual." Thus, if it were rein-
troduced in those states, it might be considered "cruel and unusual" under
the constitution of those states. This is an area where it is particularly ap-
propriate for state courts to follow Justice Brennan's suggestion to interpret
state bills of rights in a manner that is more protective of individual rights
than the federal Constitution.485
482 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
483 Id. at 595-96.
484 This effect may be thought of as the "dark side" of the Supreme Court's incorporation doctrine.
By moving state punishments practices into the purview of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has also
moved the Eighth Amendment into the purview of state punishment practices.
485 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
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E. Open Questions
Before concluding, I should make brief note of what this Article has
not covered. Most obviously, it has not covered the original meaning of the
words "cruel" and "punishment." Both of these topics need considerable
exploration because the Supreme Court has adopted a reading of both words
that does not seem to square with the Framers' understanding. Regarding
the word "cruel," the Supreme Court's current approach is almost com-
pletely incoherent. Specifically, the Court has said that a punishment is un-
acceptably cruel if it involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain"4 6 -pain that completely fails to further any legitimate penological
goal.487 But the Court has also said that the states are free to choose from
any of the four major justifications for punishment-retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation-in defining punishments for criminal of-
fenders.488 If both of these propositions are true, then the word "cruel" has
no meaning, as the most barbaric forms of punishment will always further
some penological goal. Public torture of criminals, for example, would
likely serve as a powerful deterrent, even though such punishment is far be-
yond the offender's desert. Similarly, a life sentence for a person convicted
of repeated parking violations might not run afoul of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause because it furthers the goal of incapacitation.
The word "punishment" provides its own set of problems. The Court
has narrowly defined the term to include only the penalties inflicted on
criminal offenders as the result of criminal convictions, not other forms of
state coercion, such as civil commitment.489 As Celia Rumann has shown,
however, the evidence indicates that the Framers had a broader notion of
"punishment.""49  For example, George Mason observed that Virginia's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments worked in conjunction with
its privilege against self-incrimination to prevent the use of torture to obtain
486 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
487 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (reiterating that "unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain" means pain inflicted "totally without penological justification")
488 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) ("Our traditional deference to legislative policy
choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any one
penological theory.' A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence,
retribution, or rehabilitation. Some or all of these justifications may play a role in a State's sentencing
scheme. Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures,
not federal courts." (citations omitted)).
489 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1977) ("'The primary purpose of (the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause) has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method
or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes .... .' In the few cases where the
Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable." (quoting
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968))); cf Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (distinguish-
ing civil commitment of sex offenders from incarceration for general deterrence or retributive purposes).
490 See Rumann, supra note 30, at 673.
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evidence prior to trial."' Under current caselaw, such torture would not
technically be punishment because it is not inflicted as the result of a crimi-
nal conviction. In short, the original meanings of the words "cruel" and
"punishment" need further exploration, and may yield results that help put
the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence back on track.
V. CONCLUSION
The framers of the Bill of Rights understood the word "unusual" to
mean "contrary to long usage." Recognition of the word's original meaning
will precisely invert the "evolving standards of decency" test and ask the
Court to compare challenged punishments with the longstanding principles
and precedents of the common law, rather than shifting and nebulous no-
tions of "societal consensus" and contemporary "standards of decency."
This shift in focus will tie the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
more firmly to the text and make the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause a better source of protection for criminal defendants against the
whims of temporarily enflamed public opinion. Finally, it will permit the
Court to refocus its attention away from traditional punishments that are al-
ready on the way out and toward the much graver danger posed by legisla-
tive attempts to enact cruel innovations in punishment.
491 3 ELLIorr'S DEBATES, supra note t, at 452.
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